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From the end of a trail
a man looks back
For forty years he trod a trail that ran between his
office and his home and for forty years made every
client's problems his problems too. Came then the
day when for the last time he prepared to lock his
office door and once more travel down that wellworn trail. For the last time too he closed the covers
of a long-familiar book, and as he pondered how
that book had served his needs, Le Grand J.Woods,
Esq. of Corpus Christi, Texas, of his own accord sat
down and wrote to us
"I am retiring from the practice of law-but
I want you to know how much I have enjoyed and appreciated your great works.
No successful lawyer can get along without
them and would be very foolish to attempt
to do so. I feel indebted to Shepard's Citations for whatever success I may have had in
the practice of law for 40 years.
What greater tribute could we hope to earn?

L

Shepard's Citations
C' LCOLR
A DO SPRING-S

COLORADO
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ONE YEAR REVIEW OF MUNICIPAL LAW
By

RICHARD

L.

BANTA, JR.,

of the Denver Bar

The Supreme Court, during the past year, handed down several important decisions in this phase of the law. Zoning matters,
taxation and police power were determined by these decisions
and the Court was called upon to construe several municipal ordinances and charter provisions.
1. Zoning. In Board of Adjustment, et al., vs. Perlmutter Construction Co., et al., 1954-55 C.B.A. Adv. Sh. No. 8 the Court held
the Board of Adjustment exceeded its jurisdiction in entering an
order denying petitioners the right to change a nonconforming use
of property to a more restrictive use when that right is granted by
ordinance. The property in question had not been subdivided but
had been zoned, one portion being business "A" zone, while the
remainder was residence "B" zone. The entire south half of the
area was subject to a nonconforming use as a brick yard. Petitioners contended the north half of the area was also subject to a nonconforming use. A building permit was issued on the basis of an
affidavit supporting the application for a permit relating to continuance of the nonconforming use. However the permit was later
revoked for the reason the north half of the area was amenable to
the requirements of the zoning ordinance. The Board of Adjustment not only sustained the building inspector, but found that
the petitioners had lost the right to operate a nonconforming use
on any part of the area. In sustaining the trial court in its findings
that the petitioners had not abandoned or discontinued the nonforming use, the Supreme Court held the situation presented a
clear case for application of a part of the zoning ordinance which
prohibits a change in a nonconforming use "unless to a more restrictive use." Petitioners having sought to substitute a more restrictive use for nonconforming property the inspector and the
board were without jurisdiction to deny the permit. The more
restrictive use was authorized and given as a right to the property
owner by the terms of the ordinance.
2. Taxation. The constitutionality of an ordinance levying an
occupational tax on cigarette and tobacco sales was determined in
favor of the city in City of Pueblo vs. Pullaro, et al., 1954-55 C.B.A.
Adv. Sh. No. 3. The ordinance provided that a wholesale dealer
shall affix a stamp purchased from the city to each package of
cigarettes or tobacco before delivery to the retailer and shall
collect the amount of the tax from the retailer the wholesaler
being allowed a discount of eight per cent for trouble and expense.
The ordinance provided that it was intended that the tax ultimately be collected from, and paid by the consumer. Retailers
challenged the ordinance as being discriminatory and unconstitutional as applied to them as retailers received nothing for collecting the tax from the consumer whereas the wholesaler was compensated by a discount for his trouble in affixing the stamp and
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collecting the tax from the retailer. Judgment of the District
Court holding the ordinance unconstitutional and invalid was reversed, the Court holding the retailers failed to establish that the
operation of the ordinance was discriminatory as to them inasmuch
as a retailer had the same opportunity to obtain the discount where
cigarette stamps were purchased direct from the city and affixed
rather than purchasing cigarettes through a wholesaler who provided this service. In support of this position the Court held that
a seller can be required to collect an excise tax from a purchaser
without compensation and may be required to keep an accurate
account thereof; that tobacco dealers may, for taxation purposes,
be classified as wholesale and retail dealers as they are clearly
separate and distinct occupations, and where such statutes and
ordinances are in effect, they have been sustained as not being
discriminatory or unconstitutional as to retailers.
3. Bonded Debt. The decision in Hebel, et al., vs. School District R-1, County of Jefferson, et al., 1954-55 C.B.A. Adv. Sh. No. 6,
relates to the authority of a school district to issue bonds within
the lawful debt limit as authorized by a vote of the taxpaying
electors of the district. The result is of interest to municipalities.
It was held that a bonded indebtedness is not created by the authorization of a bond issue, but only when bonds are actually issued; that the applicable debt limit is determined at the time of
the issuance of bonds whether issued in one or more series and
when the limitation is based on a percentage of the valuation, the
limit of the debt is determined by the percentage of the assessed
valuation in effect when the actual debt is created as in this case
the fixed percentage of the assessed valuation of the year next
preceding the date of the bonds. The school district bonds were
held valid. The board, in arranging for an election and time thereof, is not required to determine the date on which bonds are issued.
The function of the board is to propose and suggest an amount;
the electors determine whether the bonds shall be issued, which as
there may be from time to time, within the then lawful limit.
"Time to time" could only be at such times when, under the applicable statute, the property valuations of the year before would
keep the issue within the statutory limit.
4. Power of Arrest. In Matt L. Walker and Town of Sheridan vs. Lee Tucker and Glen Tucker, 1954-55 C.B.A. Adv. Sh. No. 7,
the plaintiffs in error were relieved of judgments entered in the
lower court on the claim of false imprisonment arising out of the
defendant-in-error's arrest by Walker, the town marshall. The
Town of Sheridan had authorized the closing of an area used but
not dedicated. as a public street; barricades were installed and
subsequently destroyed by the Tuckers. The marshall who witnessed the destruction of the barricades, acting without a warrant,
placed the Tuckers in the county jail under arrest. In reversing
the judgment of the trial court against Walker the court held that
public policy requires and supports the maintenance of an authorized peace officer in an incorporated town, and to hold that a
peace officer, be he policeman, town marshall, constable or sheriff,
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must stand by and witness the violation of a town ordinance and
the destruction of its property without resisting the violation,
and apprenhending the violator would be a travesty upon justice
and the police powers inherent in any municipal corporation. It
was further held that the town was not liable to the Tuckers as
the Board of Trustees by statute had the power to regulate the
use of the streets, and the placing of the barricade was in the exercise of its lawful governmental capacity. The town acting within
its governmental capacity falls within the rule of immunity against
liability in connection with the enforcement of its ordinances.
5. Contracts to Lowest Bidder. It was held in William H. McNichols, as Auditor, vs. City and County of Denver, et al., 1954-55
C.B.A. Adv. Sh. No. 1, that under a charter provision providing
that "all contracts for local improvements
lowest reliable and responsible bidder, .

. . .
. .",

shall be let to the
the courts should

not interfere with the determination of the authorities involved
in such matters as to who was the lowest reliable and responsible
bidder where made in good faith and to the interest of the public,
without collusion or fraud and free of personal favoritism as the
basis of reasonable discretion. The exercise of discretion is provided for and expected. In the exercise of this discretion, a determination of responsibility is first made, and if this were not
so, then the charter would undoubtedly have been so worded
that contracts be let to the lowest bidder regardless. A further
question was decided by the court in that it was held that the
charter provision concerning letting of contracts was not applicable
to architects and others in skilled professions. Though the facts
of the case involved a contract with an architect, the court sustained the trial court's finding which in substance was that in
the exercise of discretion the Manager of Improvements and Parks
acted in good faith without any taint of fraud and recommended
the lecting of the contract to the lowest responsible bidder.
6. Pension Plans. In William H. McNichols, as Auditor, et. al.,
vs. City and County of Denver, et al., 1954-55 C.B.A. Adv. Sh. No. 8,
the auditor questioned the validity of an ordinance which terminated an employee pension plan and directed distribution to employees of the unexpended contributions of the city. A taxpayer
alleged that distribution to employees of city contributions was
prohibited by Article XI, Sec. 1, 2 of the Constitution of the State
of Colorado. It was held:
(1) The ordinance was valid under the charter of the city
which empowered the City Council to fix the "compensation" of
employees by ordinance. Under the pension ordinance all persons
subsequently employed became members of the plan as a condition of their employment, and benefits arising therefrom were
part of the "compensations" to be received by employees. The
plan under the ordinance contemplated termination in the event
of coverage under social security. The Council had discretion to
terminate the plan as well as to create it.
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(2). There is no distinction between employees who voluntarily
became members o f the plan and those who were required to become members as a condition of their employment.
(3) The contributions of the beneficiary as well as those of
the city were to be distributed pursuant to the provision of the
ordinance.
(4) Persons receiving retirement or disability payments did
not have a right to continuation of payments or any claim against
the fund for future payments as the ordinance creating the pension
fund contained provisions under which those rights could be ended,
and participation in the distribution of assets upon termination
of the plan ended the right to other benefits.
(5) The employee who withdrew his contributions on termination of his employment received nothing from distribution of
the fund as provided by the creating ordinance.
(6) Credit Union claims against the fund by assignment of employees were held valid.
(7) In computing service records of employees only full years
of service were counted.
7. Civil Service. City and County of Denver, et al., vs. Ethel
D. Norris, 1954-55 C.B.A. Adv. Sh. No. 8, involved the interpretation of a charter amendment which the city contended abolished
the position of police matron held by the defendant in error. No
mention or provision was made in the charter amendment for the
position of matron. The trial court held the amendment did not
abolish the position, which ruling was sustained by the Supreme
Court, it being stated that any reorganization of an existing department of government attempted by charter amendment does
not mean or require the abolition of prevailing offices, unless the
intention to eliminate the specific office is clearly apparent. A
later amendment which is not inconsistent with a prior amendment
does not repeal the latter by implication.
8. Public Park. An injunction was sought in the case of Carl
A. McLaughlin, et al., vs. The City and County of Denver, et al.,
1954-55 C.B.A. Adv. Sh. No. 8, to restrain the city from installing
athletic facilities and from expending the proceeds of the bond
issue of 1948 for athletic purposes in Congress Park. The Manager
of Improvements and Parks is vested, under charter provisions,
with the sole authority to lay out, regulate and improve Congress
Park. A swimming pool and bathhouse were planned for the park
It was held that this jurisdiction has adopted the modern concept
for a dedicated public park in that it is proper and legitimate that
a reasonable portion of the park area be set aside and used for
playground and recreational purposes. These uses would include
tennis courts, swimming pools and numerous other activities. The
broad discretion granted the Manager of Improvements and Parks
under the charter provision will not be disturbed as long as it is
used fairly, reasonably and honestly. Here less than 50% of the
total park area was proposed for playground and recreational facilities, and the trial court was sustained in dismissing the action.
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The University of Denver College of Low has in its excellent
Law Library a centralized group of Low Reviews representing all
sections of the United States. The use of this centralized collection
is available at all times to all members of the Bar and the College
of Law has cordially extended an invitation to the profession to
use the facilities of the-Law Library with respect to the collection
of Law Reviews and all other reference materials available.
Arnold M. Chutkow, Editor
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engineering developments, and covering Water Supply Systems, Dams, Irrigation Works, Sewerage and Sewage Disposal,
Steam, Gas, Oil and Hydro Electric Power Plans, Electric Transmission Lines, Chemical and Metallurgical Developments
and Plants, Buildings, Aerial Tramways, Railroads, Bridges,
Foundations, Highways and Streets, Airports and Hangars,
Land Surveys, Land Classification, and Mining Developments.

Any Engineering Problem Presented to Us
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ONE YEAR REVIEW OF CASES ON CONTRACTS
By PAUL

GOLDSMITH,

of the Denver Bar

For the purpose of this review, the cases have been divided
into (A) Six cases which were affirmed by the Supreme Court,
and (B) Six cases which were reversed in whole or in part
by the Supreme Court.
A. CASES AFFIRMED:
Ralph Yockey, etc, vs Mae I. Graves, Executrix, etc.'
The defendant Yockey is a common carrier of live stock. Defendant contracted with Plaintiff's testator to transport a large
number of cows and calves from a designated place in Colorado
to a designated place in Wyoming. Owing to bad roads and adverse
weather conditions the defendant's drivers "jumped" the cattle
before reaching the designated destination. As a result, 40 cows
and 70 calves were lost and unaccounted for. Plaintiff obtained
judgment for the agreed value of the lost cattle and defendant
was denied recovery of shipping charges. The defendant sought
reversal on various grounds summarized, for the purposes here
pertinent as follows: (a) that the damages were due to an act of
plaintiff's agent or (b) due to an act of God.
The Supreme Court refused to inquire into the trial's findings of facts which appear to have been made on disputed evidence.
The trial Court found among other facts that the plaintiff was
not negligent and that there was no act of God, no act of any public
enemy, no inherent nature of the goods shipped which would
operate to excuse the defendant, and that defendant breached its
contract to carry.
Held: affirmed. (1) "The general rule . . . is that carriers of
live stock are liable absolutely for loss of or injury to stock entrusted to them for transportation, like other common carriers,
unless the loss or injuries were occasioned by the act of God, or
the public enemy, or the negligence of the shipper, except that they
are not liable for loss or injury caused by the "proper vice" of
natural propensities of the animals themselves, and not by any
negligence on the part of the carriers."
Citing: Colorado & Southern Railway Co. vs. Breniman, 22
Colo. App. 7, 125 P. 855 and Moore on Carriers, page 509. (2) This
being an action for breach of contract, and the breach being shown,
plaintiff was not required to establish negligence on the part of
defendant. Damages for the breach being recoverable independently of the question of defendant's negligence.
Montgomery Ward & Company vs. R. A. Reich.Defendant, Reich, was store manager for the plaintiff company
under a written agreement prepared by the company which stated
the base salary and provided for payment of "extra compensaI 2__

C_,281 P. 2d 1004.
C.._ 282 P. 2d 1091.
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tion" on the basis of a sliding percentage of "net profit" during
the applicable fiscal year of the company. The contract stated:
* . If, during the year, your employment is terminated for
any
reason . . . both your eligibility for Extra Compensation and the

amount thereof, if any, shall be at the discretion of a Bonus Committee . . ." and "No extra compensation or any part thereof shall

become due or payable before the end of the fiscal year." When
the company sued Reich on his open account, Reich counterclaimed
for $1,134.54 of "extra compensation" although Reich had voluntarily left the employment of the company 8 months after the year
began. The jury awarded Reich a verdict for $706.34, after deducting the agreed amount of the open account. Judgment was entered
on this verdict and this reviewed on writ of error.
Held: Judgment on the verdict affirmed. (2 justices dissenting,
1 not participating)
1. Forfeitures are not favored in the law, and to be effectual,
must be clear and unequivocal; and 2. this contract is to be liberally
construed in favor of defendant because it was drafted by plaintiff.
3. In the absence of any failure on the part of defendant to faithfully serve plaintiff under this contract, justice requires that it be
determined that he earned the proportionate part of the net profit
of the store for the period which he served. 4. The statement: "no
extra compensation or any part thereof shall become due or payable before the end of the fiscal year" is not a condition concerning the payment of extra compensation, but is only a fixing of the

DONALD B. GRAHAM, Pres.

CLAUDE L. GOFF, Vice Pres.

The Adams County Abstract Company
Licensed and Bonded Abstracters
Signatory Agent for Title Guaranty Co.

23 South 4th St.

Phone Brighton 16
FOUNDED 1902

Brighton, Cola

ATlas 8-0706
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time at which it was to be paid-net profit could not be determined until the end of the year. 5. In giving the bonus committee
discrution, it is implied that the bonus committee will act upon
a sound judgment and it is, of course, precluded from arbitrary or
oppressive action. 6. There is no showing of bad faith on the part
of the committee, it did not abuse its discretion, it just simply did
not use discretion in construing the terms of the contract liberally
in defendant's favor; but was misguided in its interpretation to
the effect that no extra compensation could be claimed by defendant because he did not serve until the end of the fiscal year.
George H. Curtis, as Conservator . . . et. al. v. E. E. Wilson.

Plaintiffs secured a written option from defendant to purchase
defendant's interest in certain partnership assets, including state
land leases on Oct. 7, 1948. Plaintiffs and defendant had been
partners in the ranching business. Dec. 27, 1948, plaintiffs paid
the total purchase price for defendants interest in assets and leases
to defendant. January 6, 1950, plaintiffs secured approval of the
assignment of defendant's interest in the state leases from the
State Land Board and paid the board, voluntarily, the sum of
$2,500.00 in connection with a re-assignment of the leases to a
third party. August 1950, plaintiffs actually transferred and assigned the leases to the third party. Paragraph 3 of the State Land
Lease p~ovided that upon assignment the lessees shall pay to the
State Land Board one-half of the capital gain on said leases. Paragraph II of the option agreement stated: "II . . . said payment
(the option price) to be made upon the . . . assignment of said State

Leases ...and upon the approval of said assignment by the State
Board of Land Commissioners." The payment of December 27,
1948, by plaintiffs to defendant was made before such approval
was obtained, and the payment to the State Land Board was shown
to have been computed with reference to the transfer to the third
party. Plaintiffs sued defendant for one-half of the payment to the
State Land Board, their complaint was dismissed by the trial court.
Held: "There being no term in the contract requiring defendant to secure the approval of the State Land Board, and the
state land lease terms not being incorporated into the contract by
8.

C -,

282 P. 2d

1079.

LAW OFFICE SPACE AVAILABLE
A single or 2 separate offices are available in First National
Bank Building for subletting. Term: 24 months or less. Office
facilities include furnished reception room, wall-to-wall carpeting,
secretarial space, telephone and receptionist PBX operator. Rent is
reasonable.
If interested, come in and see Suite 810, First National Bank
Building, or call AMherst 6-1312 for details.
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reference or interpretation, and plaintiffs' payment of $2,500.00
capital gain on the leases being voluntary by plaintiffs, the trial
court was right in holding the requirements alleged to be performed by defendant were not established." Which means: The
plaintiff failed to show that the defendant was under any duty to
pay.
Phillip Niernberg, v. Nathan B. Feld et. al.4
This was an action to recover a deposit of $1,500.00 paid by
Mr. and Mrs. Feld to Mr. and Mrs. Niernberg under the terms of
a "receipt and option" regarding real estate. Finding that they
would not be able to comply with the requirements to purchase
the real estate, Mr. Feld and Mr. Niernberg met in the office of
the Felds attorney and there was a verbal agreement that the
deposit of $1,500.00 would be refunded if the sellers later sold the
property for the same or a greater price than that stated in the
"receipt and option." The Niernbergs did in fact later sell the
property for the same or a greater price than that price the Felds
were to pay. The oral agreement was denied by Mr. Niernberg,
but found by the jury to have been made. Mrs. Niernberg, not
having been a party to the alleged rescission, and having denied
the authority of her husband to enter into such a rescission, was
dismissed from the action.
Held: Affirming the verdict and judgment thereon for refund
of the deposit: (1) This is a case of first impression in Colorado,
and though there is a conflict in decisions of other jurisdictions,
the better reasoned rule is that the statute of frauds (Ch.71, Sec.
con.erns the making of contracts only, and does not apply to
parol agreements rescinding a prior written executory contract
involving title to, or an interest in, lands. 2. The consideration for
the rescission was a promise for a promise involving the release
of each party from further performance. 3. The fact that Mr. Niernberg assumed to act for himself and Mrs. Niernberg in her absence cannot be urged to relieve him of his own actions and declarations.
4.

C_._

283 P. 2d 640.

-ayril
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Associated Master Barbers of America, Local No. 115, etc. vs. Journeyman Barbers, Hairdressers,etc.Reeves and the Journeyman Barbers, etc., brought action under R.C.P. 57 (b) for construction of a contract. Neither of the
plaintiffs were parties to the contract they sought to have construed. Reeves had previously had a contract with the Associated
Master Barbers but refused to sign the contract under examination, a contract which had been signed by over 400 barber shop
operators. From a dismissal of the complaint this review was prosecuted.
Held: Affirmed. (1) To permit action under Rule 57 (b) there
must be involved a judicial declaration of right "under a . . .
contract . . ." It is well settled that a proposed contract affords
plaintiff no right to have it construed, and since no contract or
rights of the parties is adversely affected, plaintiffs' action cannot stand. (2) This is not a class action. There is no allegation in
the complaint, neither is there any evidence in the record, that
the persons plaintiffs seek to represent are so numerous as to
make it impractical to bring them all before the court; Rule 23
(a). (3) The Court could not affect the contract of the more than
400 shop owners who have signed it unless pursuant to Rule 57
(j) they were made parties to the action. (4) The Colorado Labor
C-..; 285 P. 2d. 599.
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Peace Act C.R.S. '53 80-5-1 is inapplicable and does not prohibit
a proprietor of a three man barber shop from belonging to the
union.
Capitol Fixture & Supply Company, a Colorado Corporation, v.
National Fire Insurance Company of Hartford.
Plaintiff was a judgment creditor of a third party who held
a fire insurance policy in defendant company. This action was an
attempt to compel payment under the policy, by way of garnishment of the insurance company. The insured's fire loss occurred
December 20, '46. The writ of garnishment was issued 3 years
after the fire. Liability on the policy had been denied March 25,
1947. The policy contained standard provisions stating: ".

.

. That

no suit or action be sustainable unless commenced within twelve
months after the inception of the loss . . ." The Supreme Court

approved the findings of the trial court that there had been no
waiver of the requirements that proof of loss be filed within 60
days and that suit be instituted within 12 months of the loss. The
court further approved the trial court's finding that there was
no sufficient excuse for the failure to file the proof of loss within
60 days of the fire and determined that the 12 month limitation
on suit upon the insurance contract was not unreasonable, pointing to Daly v. Concordia Fire Ins. Co., 16 Colo. App. 349, 65 Pac.
416, wherein a six months' limitation upon the time within which
suit may be instituted is not unreasonable.
So here the garnisher, who was not a party to the insurance
contract, loses and the court gave full effect to the condition precedent of filing of proof of loss within 60 days of loss and to the
condition subsequent that required suit be commenced within 12
months of date of loss.
B. CASES REVERSED IN WHOLE OR IN PART:
Theodore Argys, Gust Argys, doing business as Argys Brothers
Garage vs. F. D. McGlothlen, Dorothy Cowan and Muriel
Patricia
7
Brooks, doing business as Cowan Coal and Feed Yard.
Defendants Cowan and Brooks, as sole heirs of George F.
C

279 P. 2d. 435.

276 P. 2d. 983.
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Cowan inherited the Cowan Coal and Feed Yard. After two years
operation of the same, they sold it in 1947 to McGlothlen, on contract. McGlothlen defaulted in payment, and in December 1950
Cowan and Brooks repossessed the business. At that time there
were accounts receivable of some $7,000.00, and they agreed to
collect these accounts and pay the debts of the business out of
the same. In July 1952 this action was instituted to collect $1,426.96
being incurred between January 9, 1950, and January 11, 1951,
by McGlothlen as to all but $185.47, which balance had been incurred by Cowan and Brooks. The trial judge gave judgment by
default for $641.45 against McGlothlen and for $185.47 against
Cowan and Brooks who admitted they purchased goods for that
sum after the repossession. The remaining $600.00 was not involved
having been paid out by Cowan and Brooks. The trial court said
that it could not see any consideration for the promise to pay the
debts of McGlothlen. The promise to pay the debts appears to
have been oral. No question of the bulk sales law was raised.
Held, reversing. (1) Where the promise to pay the debt of
another is in consideration of property or funds received from the
debtor for the express purpose of paying the debt, an oral promise
to pay the debt is not within the statute of frauds and there is
consideration flowing from the debtor to the promissor. (2) Both
the debtor and creditor may sue on such a promise though made
to debtor alone. (3) Had defendants Cowan and Brooks collected
an amount in excess of the business debts which McGlothlen
owed, they would without question have been entitled to retain
such excess, and they were liable if the amount collected did not
equal the indebtedness assumed.
Comment: It is worth noting here that there is no direct reference in Argys vs. McGlothlen to the contract as a third party
creditor beneficiary contract. A failure to clearly understand the
nature of such third party creditor contracts has frequently been
evidenced by the contention made and were erroneously followed
by the trial court, to-wit: That there was no consideration for
the promise of Cowan and Brooks made to McGlothlen (the debtor)
to pay to plaintiff (the third party and creditor of McGlothlen).
The same failure to recognize such third party creditor relationships has also led to confusion as to whether or not such promises
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must be in writing under the statute of frauds as a promise to pay
the "debt of another." In the promise to pay the "debt of another,"
the promise is made to the creditor to whom a "third person" (the
debtor) is or later becomes obligated. In the third party contract
the debtor is himself the promisee, and the creditor is the third
person. The Promissor as in Argys vs. McGlothlen is by his contract not answering for the "debt of another" but for his own debt
arising out of his contract with the debtor-promisee. In the promise to answer for the debt of another, which must be in writing
(C.R.S. '53, 59-1-12 (2)), the debtor is not a party to the contract,
but is the third person, whereas the creditor is the promisee and
is a party to the contract.
Herbert J. Newcomb, Jr., and Bernard H. Johnson, plaintiffs in
error vs. Betty W. Schaeffler and Willy J. Schaeffler, Defendants
in error.8
Plaintiffs, owners, sued for damages on breach of written
contract. Plaintiffs contracted to pay cost plus $2,000.00 to defendants, contractors, for the erection of a residence on plaintiffs'
lots and defendants contracted to erect the residence "as shown
on the drawings and described in the specifications prepared by
Owners" and "to find, provide and furnish such materials of such
kinds, qualities and descriptions, as shall be fit, proper and sufficient for completing and finishing all the work or works mentioned in a good, substantial and workmanlike manner to the satisfaction of and under the direction of the owner." Plaintiffs paid
for all materials and work, and paid $1,000.00 of defendants' profit.
No specifications were ever prepared, but plans were. Work was
commenced in July 1951, and continued until September 1951,
when defendant Johnson reported to one of the plaintiffs that
cracks had developed in the foundation and walls of the house.
This condition was due to the settling of the soil and evidence
showed that thereafter some work was done to solidify the soil
by chemical treatment and to underpin the foundation.
On trial to the Court the following damages were found to
have been sustained by plaintiffs:
._,

279 P. 2d. 409.
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(a) $1,350.00 to correct the soil condition
(b) $4,000.00 major structural repairs, etc.
(c) $1,500.00 replacing certain moldings and trim, patching
plaster, replacing brick, etc.
(d) $200.00 delay in completion.
The damages totaled $7,050.00, from which the court deducted
$1,000.00 being the balance of defendants' profits under the contract.
As to items (b), (c) and (d) the Court stated, without citing authority: "under the well-known rule that a finding of fact based
on conflicting testimony will not be set aside upon review, we
cannot reverse the judgment so far as it relates to the items embraced in the award of $5,700.00.
Regarding the item of $1,350.00 awarded for the soil solidification, the court found it could have been done for $600.00 prior to
the time the cement floors were laid in the basement. (Plaintiffs
contended they should not have to pay for any part of this solidification.) The $600.00 would have fallen under "cost" under the
"cost plus" contract, and should have been deducted by the trial
court. In this connection, the Court approved the rule as follows:
"If he (contractor) wishes to protect himself against the
hazards of the soil ....

he must do so in his contract."

White vs.

Mitchell, 123 Wash. 630 213 Pac. 10. "If the difficulties are apparent
on the surface he must overcome them. If they are not, but become apparent by excavation or the sinking of the building, the
rule is the same. He must overcome them, and erect the building
simply because he has agreed to do so-to do everything necessary
for that purpose."
Superintendent vs. Bennett, 27 N.J. 513, 72 Am. Dec. 373.
At the common law a contractor who undertakes an entire
contract for erecting a building is presumed, in the absence of
any express provision to the contrary, to have assumed the risk
of unforeseen contingencies arising during the course of the work.
. .. Under this rule there is no implied warranty of the sufficiency
of the soil to support the building to be erected, and the contractor
assumes the risk of loss incident to such defectiveness."
To be entitled to the $2,00.00 profit, the defendants must show
that they had substantially complied with their contract. This
means that although the conditions of the contract have been devi-
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ated from in trifling particulars, not materially detracting from
the benefit the other party would derive from a literal performance, he has received substantially the benefit he expected, and
is therefore bound to pay. The court then approved the holding in
Nance v. PattersonBldg. Co., 140 Ky. 564, 13 S.E. 635. "As a matter
of law, it is a substantial failure if the foundation of a house cracks
so as to leak and crumble immediately after its completion;
whereas, if it had been properly constructed it would have done
neither." Therefore, defendants are not entitled to any part of
this $1,000.00 balance of profits. Here the deviations from plans
and contract were not trivial or slight . . . defendants did not

perform in a good and workmanlike manner and the structure
as delivered was not satisfactory to plaintiffs. Judgment modified
and cause remanded with instructions to enter judgment in favor
of plaintiffs for $6,450.00.
Query: If the plaintiffs had asked for a further allowance
of $1,000.00, representing the portion of profit forwarded to and
retained by defendants, should plaintiffs have been awarded this
additional amount? It is the reviewer's belief that since there
was not substantial performance, as a matter of law, there would
have been good grounds for a claim for refund of this profit.
Clesta Johnson Holscher, as the Administratrixof the Estate of Paul
F. Holscher, Jr., deceased et al. vs. Charles N. Ferry, Defendant
in Error.'
Ferry, plaintiff, sued to rescind a contract of May 23, 1952,
under which he sold his interest in Winslow & Associates Construction Co. to defendants' intestate, for an agreed consideration
of $20,000.00 represented by four $5,000.00 promissory notes. Paul
F. Holscher, Jr., the.purchaser, died July 10, 1952. The contract
interest in Winslow & Associates Construction Co., was inventoried at $12,000.00, but the best offer made to the administratrix
for this interest was $6,500.00. August 28, 1952, plaintiff filed his
claim for $20,000.00 in the estate proceedings basing the claim on
the notes, the claim was allowed by the County Court and never
withdrawn. When it appeared that the claims in the estate exceeded the value of the estate and plaintiff would receive much
* _

280 P. 2d 655.
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less than the sale price of $20,000.00, plaintiff, on January 28,
1953, made demand for rescission of the contract and on February
11, 1953, filed suit for rescission. The promissory notes were attached to the claim filed in the County Court. The defendants
contend that the purchase under the contract of May 23, 1952,
was a fully executed transaction and that the filing and allowance of the claim in the County Court was an election and barred
the plaintiff from prosecuting this action; that the only relationship between plaintiff and decedent was that of debtor and creditor. The trial court held that "there was breach of a dependent
covenant (payment)" and that equity required the recission of the
contract. A writ of error was obtained to review this judgment.
Held: Plaintiff, by filing his claim in County Court for $20,000.00 based on the notes, affirmed the contract and waived his
right to rescind, especially as he never withdrew this claim and
it was allowed.
(1) The notes, attached to and filed with and in support of
the claim in County Court, were merged in the judgment of the
County Court when the claim was allowed.
(2) There is substantive inconsistency between the legal remedy of suit on the notes, by filing claim in the County Court,
which amounted to an affirmance of the contract, and the equitable
remedy thereafter sought by seeking to rescind the contract by
the instant suit. The inconsistency is clearly seen when it is recognized that the suit on the notes is based 'on title in the purchaser, and the suit to rescind is based on title in the seller.
(3) The election is not effective and there is no estoppel where
the party, in selecting his legal or equitable remedy, acts in ignorance of the facts, or where both are predicated on the affirmance
or on the disaffirmance of a contract.
(4) Where a party has alternative remedies of rescission and
of damages for breach, he must elect, at some stage, upon which
remedy he will base his action. The court then stated: "By filing
his claim in the county court Ferry affirmed the contract and at
the same time elected the remedy he wished to pursue. Having
done so, he is barred from suing in the district court for rescission . . ." "Once a claim has been filed in the county court, no

other 'court should act upon that claim, or upon the subject matter
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thereof, until the final determination by the county court. (citing
cases)."
Comment: This case may shed some light on the problem of
pleading, in the alternative, substantively different claims in the
same suit. Can it be that this light arises out of the Supreme
Court's use of the word: "especially" when the Court states:
*

* Ferry by filing his claim . . . based on the notes, affirmed

the contract and waived his right to rescind, especially as he never
withdrew this claim and it was allowed. . .

."

Where substantively

different theories for claims for relief are set forth in one complaint, there should always be the possibility of the withdrawal of
one or the other inconsistent theory for relief and a choice could
be made after all the evidence is in. Here we have suits in two
different courts, on two inconsistent theories. The same inconsistency pleaded alternatively in a single suit. Would not amount to
an election to affirm. Rule 8 (e) (2) R.C.P.
It should also be noted that in the case here reviewed the
affirmance of the contract preceded the attempted rescission in
point of time, and they occurred in two distinct cases in different
courts. Generally, a prior affirmance bars a subsequent rescission;
however, a prior attempted rescission does not generally bar a
subsequent affirmance. This arises from the fact that the rescission
is, in the sense here used, not final until so decreed by the Court,
whereas, no such approval of the Court is needed to make final an
act of affirmance.

THE ARAPAHOE COUNTY
ABSTRACT & TITLE CO.
ROBERT J. KINKEL, Secretary

0

PHONE PY. 4-2681

LITTLETON, COLO.

Mar.-Apr., 1956

DICTA

Harry I. Gardnerand Maurice Gardner,general partnersdoing business as Gardner Construction Company. Plaintiffs in error, vs. City
of Englewood, a municipal corporation, defendant in error"
Plaintiffs contracted with defendant to perform certain services in connection with erection of a concrete storage reservoir
for defendant. Near the end of the construction a controversy
developed as to whether plaintiffs or defendant was to pay for
concrete used. Plaintiffs seek judgment against defendant in the
sum of $16,000.00 either on contract or quantum meruit, defendant
admits the existence of the contract, in its answer, but contends
the plaintiffs were to furnish all concrete at no cost to defendant.
At the conclusion of all evidence, the Court entered a directed
verdict in favor of defendant, without announcing any specific
findings regarding such verdict, and entered judgment against
plaintiff and for defendant. This was done on the motion of defendant alleging first, no contract, second, that quantum meruit
was not available against a municipal corporation. Upon writ of
error, the trial court was reversed.
1. The Court held that the parties treated the writing entered
into by them as a contract, and that the construction placed upon
the instrument before the controversy arose concerning it generally
is binding upon them and also the Court. The City had admitted
the existence of a contract in its answer, and any contrary determination was manifest error.
2. The sole issue to be determined is: "which party to the contract is required to furnish and pay for the 1500 odd yards of
concrete that went into the construction of the covered reservoir."
Incidental to this question is the problem of whether liability
for payment for concrete can be determined from the contract.
This being an issue of law for determination by the Court, and
in such determination the Court may call upon the following wellrecognized rules of construction:
(a)

".

.

. each and every part and portion of a contract is to

be given effect, if possible, and that where all provisions, stipulations and conditions thereof may be given effect without one contradicting the other, then the contract cannot be said to be uncerain
or ambiguous."
10 282 P. 2d. 1084.
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(b) In the event of language of doubtful meaning in a contract,
or where it appears indefinite or uncertain to a degree, it shall
be interpreted most strongly against the party who drew it.
(c) The City, in erecting its water work system, was acting in
a proprietary capacity and not a governmental capacity, and its
contracts are governed by the same rules as contracts made between individuls.
(d) In a building contract, in case of conflict or inconsistency
between them, the contract prevails over the plans and specifications, except where the terms of the contract are general; .

.

. a

copy of plans and specifications furnished the contractor and on
the faith of which his bid was made and contract entered into prevails over original plans and specs; a specific provision of the specs
controls a general provision.
(e) In interpretation of contracts "trade meaning" may in a
proper case be considered.
(f) In the absence of an ambiguity, intent is to be determined
from the contract itself, if possible to do so ,and parties are bound
by what the contract says rather than what they say.
(g) In the event the contract was determined to be ambiguous,
it would be proper to admit evidence as to which paragraphs, etc.,
are stock paragraphs and which are specially prepared for this
project.
3. Although not determinative in this case, the Court observed
that a municipal corporation is prohibited by law from disbursing
funds for purpose of such construction except upon contract.
P. W. Carpenterand Ardie Carpenter,Plaintiffs in Error vs. George
W. Hill and Nellie M. Hill, Defendants in Error"
The Carpenters as plaintiffs filed suit containing 2 causes of
action for rescission. One cause was based on fraud and was abandoned, the other on mutual mistake. Plaintiffs owned a filling
station in Pueblo and in an effort to dispose of it contacted a real
estate agency and learned of the availability for trade of a peach
orchard held under contract of purchase by defendants. The letter
of the real estate agent stated, regarding the peach orchard: "This
is a very good ranch priced at $25,000.00 with a loan of approximately $14,000 at 5 per cent interest that can be assumed. This
loan is to be paid off by crop payment which doesn't take long if
the prices are good on fruit, and everybody seems to think it will
be." Defendants told plaintiffs that they had the peach orchard
on crop payments of one-half the fruit crop, and if there was no
fruit crop the payment would be carried over, including taxes
and water assessments. The contract seller of the orchard was
Renna Aspinall, who, in February 1946, sold the property and the
defendants acquired their interest by assignment of that contract
December 10, 1949. Neither plaintiffs nor defendants saw the actual contract before the trade was completed. The contract provided that the entire balance fell due November 1, 1953. Plaintiffs
inquired at the bank holding the original contract as to the balance owing, but did not inquire as to the terms nor did they see
1t __

283 P. 2d 963.

DICTA

Mar.-Apr., 1956

the contract. On June 10, 1953, following this inquiry, a written
contract was drawn up and signed whereby plaintiffs traded their
equity in the Pueblo property for the equity of defendants in the
orchard in Mesa County. The agreement was silent as to the crop
payments. The parties exchanged deeds and entered into possession of the respective properties. About a month later, plaintiffs discovered that the balance due on the contract in the sum
of $15,252.09 was due on November 1, 1953, instead of being due
on crop payments, as they believed. Thereupon plaintiffs gave
notice of intention to terminate the contract and vacated the premises after irrigating them and filed this suit for rescission. The
trial court refused to permit rescission and would not grant damages to plaintiffs. Renna Aspinall, in March 1954, gave notice of
intention to terminate the contract and forfeit the amounts previously paid, after being permitted to intervene in this suit, and
was granted possession of the property. At the time the Supreme
Court decided the case, Renna Aspinall owned the orchard and
defendants owned the property in Pueblo County and plaintiffs
had lost the net value of the Pueblo property, namely $13,062.23.
The trial court held that plaintiffs were negligent in not discovering the terms and denied recission of the contract. The trial court
found, and it is freely admitted, that there was a mutual mistake.
The Supreme Court reversed the trial court and held:
(1) No principle is better settled than the equitable doctrine
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that an agreement is void if founded in a mutual mistake of facts
that are the very basis of the contract. The fact concerning which
the mistake was here made was the very life and substance of
the transaction; and the mistake, not only clearly proven, but
admitted, is so important that rescission, if sought, must follow.
(2) "The negligent failure of a party to know or to discover
the facts, as to which both parties are under a mistake does not
preclude rescission or reformation on account thereof." Restatement of the Law, Contracts. Section 508.
(3) If negligence was a defense, defendants were deprived
thereof by failing to file an affirmative pleading.
(4) Trial court was directed to enter judgment for plaintiffs
for restoration of their property, and if that cannot be had then
enter such judgment for damages as the court may determine
by a hearing thereon. (See case discussion by William E. Kenworthy, Dicta, Sept.-Oct. '55, P. 393)
R. M. Martin, Plaintiff in -error vs. Pueblo Dairymen's Cooperative,
Inc., Defendant in Error12
Plaintiff dairy association and defendant, producer, entered
into a contract in writing, under which defendant sold all his milk,
except that used for his home and farm, to the association from
December 1, 1941, to December 16, 1952, at which time defendant
refused to deliver further to plaintiff. Section 7 of the contract
provided for liquidated damages in case of breach of producer,
at the rate of $5.00 per cow controlled by producer at time of
breach. Section 9, provided that unless the contract was terminated
May 1 in any years, by a notice in the preceding March, the contract would continue from year to year. May 5, 1953, under Section 32, Chapter 106, '35 C.S.A., plaintiff obtained a temporary
restraining order, which November 18, 1953, was changed to a preliminary injunction to remain in effect pending trial on the merits.
Defendant continued to deliver under the injunction to May 1,
1954, when he stopped delivery, having given a written notice
in March 1954 of his intention to so do. Defendant in his answer
_
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and counterclaim filed December 1, 1954, and among other defenses, alleged: (a) failure to state a claim, (b) breach by plaintiff
in buying milk outside the association's area, thereby causing
the price to drop regarding milk purchased from defendant; (c)
admitted refusal to deliver as of January 25, 1953, and notice to
such effect at that time, and that thereby plaintiff was entitled to
$140.00 liquidated damages, @ $5.00 per cow for 28 cows controlled by defendant (d) counterclaimed for $1,500.00 damages,
incurred in selling to plaintiff under the injunction after January 25, 1953, less the $140.00 liquidated damages. The trial court
awarded damages to plaintiff and found against the defendant.
The minutes of the Association's Board of Directors for December 23, 1952, and January 25, 1953, were admitted in evidence and
show that as of December 23, 1952, the Board voted to accept the
liquidated damages from those producers shipping to another buyer
and voted to return the $5.00 (apparently the price of share in
association) to members "jumping the contract after hearing is
held or check (for liquidated damages) is received." (parenthetical
words added)
The January 25, 1953, minutes show: "Hearing for producers
who have jumped their contracts ....

11. Russell Marvin-staying

out."
Reversed and judgment granted to defendant in amount of
$1,400.00 on defendant's counterclaim.
Held: The plaintiff having called a meeting for that purpose,
received the information or notification at that time (January 25,
1953) that defendant was no longer going to deliver to plaintiff
the milk produced by defendant. No additional notice had to be
given in March 1953. Both parties already knew that the contract
was terminated as of May 1, 1953.
At the meeting of December 23, 1952, after defendant refused
to deliver further, plaintiff waived any right to injunction provided by statute. VOLUNTARY CHOICE AND ACTION BY
PLAINTIFF IS THE VERY ESSENCE OF THE WAIVER. By
resolution of December 23, 1952, defendant was no longer a member of plaintiff after his stock "was lifted" according to the resolution above quoted, after defendant "had jumped" the contract
at a hearing held thereon.
The restraining order was unwarranted. The evidence of defendant showed $1,400.00 damage to defendant and was uncontradicted.
The statute permits the liquidation of damages, here accomplished by agreement, and the ordinary and accepted meaning of
"liquidated damages" would be that upon payment or collection
of the amount specified all claims in connection therewith, and
the matter of the right to a restraining order or injunction would
depend entirely upon the terms of the marketing agreement. In
this case the agreement was for no specified period of time. After
a year the producer could cancel and be relieved from the agreement upon certain conditions therein provided.
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BASIC ESTATE TAX PLANNING
By WILLIAM J. BowE, Professor, Vanderbilt University of Law
Address delivered at 1955 Convention of the Colorado Bar
Association.
The object of estate tax planning is to so arrange the transmission of family wealth as it passes from one generation to the
next so as to provide for minimum estate and income taxes consistent with the estate owners non-tax objectives.
FivE

BASIC PRINCIPALS:

1. Lifetime Gifts: It is obvious that what is given away now
will not be part of the former owner's estate at the time of his
death. Nor will the future earnings of the property be his for income tax purposes.
2. The creation of a succession of life estates to avoid a succession of death taxes. If a life use rather than complete ownership is given to the primary donee, there will be nothing to be
taxed in his estate upon his death, since nothing passes to his estate.
Here is what may happen when this principal is forgotten. A
wealthy industrialist gave his wife $300,000 in the stock of company in 1940. He paid a gift tax of $60,000. She died in 1946. The
stock came back to him under an old will in which she had dutifully left "my entire estate to my beloved husband." But only after
the Government had collected $54,000 in estate taxes. Thus he was
back where he started except for the $114,000 that was paid to
the United States Treasury. If he had given it to her for her use
during life and upon her death to their children, the second tax
would have been avoided and the later estate tax on his death
would not have had to be paid.
3. Use of trusts to create additional tax entities or second tax
pocketbooks. Under our progressive system the total tax on $30,000, for example, is obviously much less if spread among three tax
entities than if taxed to a single individual.
4. Use of gift tax privileges, the lifetime exemption, the annual exclusion, the gift tax marital deduction and the gift splitting
option. If not used during life these benefits are irrevocably lost
since there is no carry-over to the decedent's estate.
5. Use of the estate tax marital deduction when and only to
the extent indicated in the particular situation.
It will be the object of this talk to develop these basic principals with some suggestions as to how and when to use them and
some warning as to pitfalls to avoid.
TESTMENTARY PLANS
I.

THE UNMARRIED ESTATE OWNER:

A specific illustration will show the tax consequences of a
bequest of a life estate as contrasted with a bequest of the complete
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ownership of the property. We will assume a relatively simple
situation and the effect of federal taxes only.
Mrs. Brown inherited $115,000 from her husband several years
ago. She has a son John, now 30. He works in the local bank, manages her funds for her and will ultimately inherit them. Mrs.
Brown wants a simple will, leaving everything to John. John has
a home worth $25,000, some $50,000 of life insurance, $15,000 of
stocks, bonds and other miscellaneous property. He is married
to a lady who has nominal assets but fairly good prospects of inheriting additional property from her family. They have three children. If Mrs. Brown leaves her estate to John, he will after taxes
and administration expenses, receive about $100,000. On his later
death his taxable estate will amount to $190,000, even if he makes
no further increases in his present estate. The federal tax on a gross
estate of $190,000, allowing $15,000 for debts and administration
expenses, amounts to $24,400. If instead of an estate of $190,000,
John's taxable estate is kept at $90,000 by having his mother give
him a life interest in her estate, his federal estate taxes will be
reduced to about $2,000. This saving of $22,000 may be accomplished by putting his bequest in trust for him rather than giving
it to him outright.
Are there objections to gifts in trust that may cause Mrs.
Brown to hesitate? Trusts may be associated in her mind with
spendthrifts and incompetents. John doesn't need another to do
his investing for him. Trusts tie up property too tightly. She wants
John to have a free hand in using the funds and of course John
would agree with this and, since we ought not let tax considerations outweigh other factors, perhaps John ought to have $25,000
or $35,000 outright but the bulk of the estate may better serve
the family purpose if it is in trust. The advantages are at least
worth investigating.
Of course a trust is not the same as outright ownership. If
it were we could not save the $22,000. But we can give John most
of the benefits of ownership without the attendant tax burdens.
1. John may be given the income each year.
And if you study the power of appointment section of the
code you will discover that:
2. John may be given the right to withdraw at his whim and
pleasure $5,000 of corpus each year.
3. John may be given the right to demand additional amounts
of corpus if needed to maintain his accustomed standard of living.
4. The trustee may be given the power to pay capital to John
at any time and in any amount that the trustee may in his discretion for any reason deem proper:
5. John may be given the power to direct the trustees to distribute principal to John's wife or children at any time and in
any amount that John shall decide.
6. Lastly John may be given the power to dispose of the capital
at his death to such persons as he may wish, other than his estate
or his creditors.
With all of the above flexible provisions John has most of the
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benefits of outright ownership without the tax burden. If he had
unlimited control through outright ownership, he would use it
for his benefit and the benefit of his family. Under the trust it is
available for such purposes and to a very considerable extent
John's decisions may determine the particular uses to which it
may be put. He can have $5,000 a year for any purpose, he can
demand more if needed to maintain his usual standard of living;
only if he wants sums in excess of $5,000 and beyond his needs,
must he persuade the trustee that he ought to be given them.
Income Tax Savings:
The use of the trust technique offers opportunities for the creation of additional tax entities. Since the estate will be for the ultimate benefit of the children, the fund may be divided into as many
shares as there are children, in this case at least three, each share
to be held as a separate and distinct trust but to be administered
as a unit. This is largely a matter of phraseology. It is possible to
give $50,000 in trust to pay one-third of the income to each child
or to give the trustee $50,000 to be divided into 3 funds, each fund
to be held for the benefit of a particular child. If this latter technique is used you have three tax entities among which to spread
the income. Since capital gains are almost always taxable to the
trustee, it is far better tax-wise to spread the gain among three
taxpayers and thereby keep it in lower brackets.
In the particular case we are considering there may be other
advantages in having the trusts. While Mrs. Brown wants the income to be paid to John it is too bad to force it upon him and
thereby make it taxable to him at his top tax brackets. When he
gets it, what is left after taxes, is going to be used for his children.
Would it not therefore be better to direct the trustee to pay the
income in his discretion to either John or to any one or more of
the chijdren of John? Now if the trustee, with an eye to the ultimate use and to the tax consequences, pays or applies $1,500 to
each of the three children, each will have a $600 exemption and
the balance of $900 will be taxed at the beginning rate rather than
at John's top bracket. These trusts are known as sprinkle or spraying trusts and offer tremendous income tax savings.
The trustee ought also be given authority in its discretion to
accumulate income or to use it for the purchase of life insurance
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on the lives of John and members of his family. Any income so
used or accumulated will be taxable to the trusts and may therefore be kept in the lowest bracket.
A solution of the problem presented might well be to have
John remove his insurance from his taxable estate by transferring
it to an irrevocable trust for his children. Mrs. Brown's will would
then create three trusts, with power in the trustees to pay into
John's trust sufficient income to meet the annual premiums. It
could then spray the excess income to John's children to take advantage of their $600 exemptions or could accumulate it. Under
such a plan the premiums would be paid with funds taxed at only
16% after the dividend credit rather than at John's top bracket.
All of the income could be kept within the first tax bracket. Further such a plan would not only preserve but would somewhat
increase the estate tax savings on John's death, even if he were
given $25,000 or $35,000 outright.
It should be noted that 5% of income would be taxable to John
because of his 5% withdrawal privilege.
II.

THE MARRIED ESTATE OWNER:

The Marital Deduction--what it is:
Pre-1942 status of community property. Under the law of community property, one-half of all the wealth acquired by the activities of either spouse during the marriage automatically belongs
to the other. Thus a successful Californian or Texan who amassed
$200,000 from his business operations during his married life would
own one-half, the other half by operation of law belongs to his
wife. During life he is the manager of the fund but on death he
has a power of disposal by will over only his share. This local
property rule, recognized for federal tax purposes, resulted prior
to 1942 in shocking tax inequality. Thus our Texan with $200,000
paid an estate tax on only $100,000 or a tax of $4,800. A Coloradan
similarly situated, because at least theoretically he had th_ disposal by will of the entire $200,000 paid an estate tax of $32,700.
A tax differential in favor of the Texan of $27,900.
The 1942 Legislation. In 1942 Congress attempted to eliminate
this estate tax discrimination by providing that all community
property economically attributable to a spouse was to be included
as part of his or her taxable estate. But it soon became apparent
that this approach discriminated against the Texan. Since most
families commingled their separate and community property, or
at least failed to keep adequate books earmarking individual
assets, it was frequently impossible to determine at death whether
a particular asset was separately owned or community owned.
And the civil law had a strong presumption which the tax law
incorporated that all assets were presumed to be community. The
result was that very considerable taxes were incurred solely because inadequate records had been kept. Further the effort to
equalize the burden actually gave the Coloradan an unfair advantage in that he could so devise his property as to avoid any tax
on his wife's death. The Texan, however, whose estate (to stay
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with our example) was now being measured at $200,000 could arrange for the avoidance of this second tax only with respect to
$100,000. The other $100,000 being owned outright by the wife was
taxed at her death. Thus the Texans were paying taxes on both
deaths whereas Coloradans need only pay taxes on any one death.
1948 Legislation. In 1948 Congress again attempted to place
all citizens on an equal basis, this time by a diametrically opposite
approach to that adopted in 1942. The purpose of the earlier
amendment was to extend to spouses everywhere the tax burdens
imposed in the common law states; the objective of the 1948 Act
was to grant generally the tax advantage of the community property states.
The legislation provided that property passing at death from
one spouse to the other should be free of death taxes up to 50%
of the decedent's adjust gross estate, i.e., the net estate after debts
and administration expenses but before any deduction for taxes.
Thus, the Coloradan with $200,000 who left his wife at least $100,000 could deduct this bequest (up to $100,000) and he therefore
would have the same net taxable estate as the Texan.
The Marital Deduction. When to use it:
In many cases it will obviously be desirable to provide for the
marital deduction in the will of one spouse and not in the will of
the other. This will be true wherever one spouse has the bulk of
the family wealth. Thus if husband has $300,000 and wife has
$200,000, it will be availed of in his will and not in hers. In these
cases care should be exercised to include in husband's will a
simultaneous death clause-not a common disaster clause and not
a time clause but a simultaneous death clause. The law is clear
that the wife must survive in order for the husband's estate to
be entitled to the marital deduction. The regulations make it clear
that if there is no evidence as to the survivorship then the local
law or a presumption supplied by the Will will govern. The clause
should read "if the order of deaths cannot be established by proof,
it shall be presumed the wife survived." The presence of this provision in the Will assures the marital deduction if both spouses
happen to die in a common accident or event and there is no proof
that one in fact survived the other. Absent such a provision the
marital deduction will be lost since under Simultaneous Death
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Act, law in 45 states, the husband would be deemed to have survived for purposes of the distribution of his estate.
There will be other cases where its use is less clear. The wife
may have nominal assets but prospects of inheriting a substantial
estate from her father-how much and in what form Papa won't tell
and, of course, son-in-law is hesitant to ask. If all is to go to her
in trust, you would want to use it, if it is to go to her outright,
use of the deduction could prove very costly.
There are other situations where each of the spouses has substantial wealth. Thus if each has $300,000, use of the deduction in
the estate of first dying spouse will have the difference between
$17,500 and $59,100 or $41,600, but will increase the tax on estate
of second dying spouse from $59,000 to $102.000, an increase of
$43,000, and incur $22,500 of extra Colorado taxes.
It is a good rule that wherever doubt exists to provide for the
maximum marital deduction with a provision in the will that the
surviving spouse may disclaim in whole or in part. This delays
the decision as long as possible and has the following advantages:
1. The wife may decide when all the facts are known how
much of the marital deduction to use, by making a partial disclaimer.
2. The wife may enjoy for her life the use of the money retained through deferring the tax.
3. The wife may make gifts to the children after her husband's
death and to the extent these come within her exclusion and lifetime exemption the funds will escape tax on both deaths.
In these cases where the deduction is provided for because
it is anticipated that the wife will have an opportunity to renounce or to make gifts a different type of survivorship clause
should be used. Since it is possible that they may die in a common accident or that the wife may die within a relatively short
time after her husband and before she has had an opportunity to
disclaim or make the suggested gifts, a clause may be inserted
in the will providing that the wife's bequest shall not become
effective unless she survives her husband by six months. Here
the time clause rather than the simultaneous death clause should
be used.
Common disaster clauses, i.e., in the event my wife and I
perish in a common disaster or as a result of a common peril, etc.,
are dangerous in that they may cause litigation, may leave titles
unsettled for years and can result in the property being subjected
to tax in both estates since the regulations provide that if on a
final audit of the return it is still possible that the surviving
spouse's interest may fail because her later death may be traceable
back to a common accident, the deduction will be disallowed.
H and W are in a motor accident. H is killed. W, badly
crippled and bedridden, lives on for years, without ever fully recovering. When, if ever, during W's life can her executor safely
pay over the bequest. How can he ever be sure that her later
death when it occurs may not have been proximately caused by
the accident. There may be a fire in which she burns to death
because she can't walk or subsequent negligent medical treatment
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such as the careless attachment of artificial legs may result in a
fatal fall. Perhaps the executor will risk such possibilities, but
query if the Revenue Agent, with any knowledge of the tort law
of proximate causation, will or may overlook the risks.
QUALIFYING GIFTS FOR THE MARITAL DEDUCTION:

Not every bequest to a spouse will qualify for the marital
deduction. Generally speaking the wife must be given the fee
to the property or its tax equivalent. A life estate to the wife,
an estate during widowhood, a power on the part of anyone else
to consume the property will disqualify the bequest.
Under existing law the wife must be given:
1. Absolute ownership.
2. A life estate with remainder to her estate. Just what this
gives her is doubtful since there are few cases on the subject.
Lawyers did not in the past and do not now create such estates.
3. A life estate with a general power of appointment. This
type of qualifying gift is new and under the 1954 Code. It is designed to take care.of the practice in many jurisdictions of leaving
the estate to the wife for life with power to consume. If you use
this device be careful to follow the statute. Give her a life estate
with "a general power to appoint by deed or by Will." Don't
give her a right "to sell or dispose of" or "a right to consume" or
use any of the other traditional clauses. If you depart from the
statute, you may be asking for trouble.
4. A bequest in trust under which the wife is given (a) the
income for life and (b) a general power of appointment by deed
or by will.
In practice the marital gift will either be outright or in trust.
FORMULA CLAUSES:

A bequest of the entire estate outright to the wife will, as we
have noted, assure the marital deduction. The trouble with it is
that it qualifies too much property. Thus in a $200,000 estate the
husband would thereby obtain a $100,000 marital deduction which
with the $60,000 exemption would leave a taxable estate of $40,000
and a tax of $4,800. But on the subsequent death of the wife, the
entire $200,000 would be subject to estate taxes amounting to
$32,700.
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Nor will a bequest of one-half outright and one-half in trust
with a special power of appointment achieve the objective. In
few cases, if any, does the estate passing under the Will equal the
tax estate. Almost everyone owns assets that are not part of his
probate estate. Jointly owned property, life insurance, many deferred compensation contracts form part of the tax estate but not
of the probate estate. Indeed the largest parts of most estates pass
ouside the Will.
Thus assume Mr. X has
Cash in Bank
$5,000
Residence, tax owned as tenant by the entirities
with his wife
30,000
Life Insurance
60,000
U.S. "E" Bonds, payable at death to wife
10,000
Business interest
80,000
Miscellaneous
5,000
His tax estate will total
$190,000
$190,000
His probate estate will total only
90,000
A bequest under the will of one-half his estate to his wife
would amount to $45,000 less half the cost of debts and administration. How much would qualify for the marital deduction would
depend on the recipients of the non-probate assets. If the wife
was lump sum beneficiary of all the insurance then the residence,
the insurance, the bonds and her bequest, a total of $145,000 would
qualify but the maximum allowable deduction would only be $95,000.
Such a clause would unnecessarily qualify $50,000.
Under the facts assumed the will should be so drawn that
none of the wife's bequest will be subject to taxes on her death.
But the difficulty with this solution is that assets do not remain
static. He may sell the residence on his retirement and then cash
the bonds on maturity. Suppose he invests these funds in stocks
in his own name. Further assume his son needs a $20,000 short
term loan in his business and father pledges his insurance with the
Bank, and the beneficiary, as banks usually require, is changed to
his estate. Now nothing outside the will qualifies and the marital
deduction is wholly lost.
What is needed is a flexible clause. Such a provision should
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tentatively set aside $95,000. You would then subtract the insurance, the bonds, the residence or $100,000, leaving nothing to pass
under this clause of the will. It would all pass to the wife but
under a later clause giving her the income plus a special power of
appointment-the typical non-marital deduction trust. If his assets
had been shifted, as assumed, his wife under the clause would
receive $95,000-the maximum allowable marital deduction.
A word of warning about the indiscriminate use of these
clauses may be appropriate. They have been criticized and they
can cause real trouble in a limited class of cases. Thus assume
the case of a second wife who is not on speaking terms with the
children of the first marriage. The husband's probate estate consists of $150,000. To placate the children who resented the second
marriage he gave them $50,000. The Commissioner suggests that it
may have been in contemplation of death. And just to make it
interesting the Comimsisoner has "jacked up" the value of his
business interest by $50,000.
Now under one of these clauses the widow is on the Commissioners side. If she tells enough family secrets to have the gift
included as part of the taxable estate as one in contemplation of
death, her bequest under the will is increased by $25,000. If she
remembers that he told her he would not sell his business for
twice the sum reported by the executor and therefor she says the
Commissioner's proposed increase in value is very reasonable
she is furnishin_ excellent evidence to further increase her bequest
by another f25,000.
Those who object to the use of formula clauses do so with
situations like this in mind. And, of course, you ought to have
them in mind. But in 99% of the cases you have family harmony
and all can be counted on to band together against the tax collector
-the common enemy.
I think the best test of the desirability and practicality of these
clauses is the testimony of those who have worked most intimately
with the marital deduction in the seven years of its operationthe trust officers of the banks and I think there is almost universal
agreement among them that the difficulties posed by the objectors
are theoretical, not real. Their big complaint is that these clauses
are not sufficiently widely used.
NON-MARITAL DEDUCTION BEQUESTS TO SPOUSES:

With respect to the portion of the estate that does not fall into
the marital deduction trust, it would go into a testamentary trust
similar to that outlined for the unmarried estate owner, with the
wife as a discretionary beneficiary. Thus she may be designated
as one of the benficiaries to whom the trustee in his discretion
may pay all or part of the income and to whom he may distribute
all or part of the principal with the proviso that he shall first
exhaust the principal of the marital trust. The reason for this is
to provide for the consumption of the taxable portion of her estate
before consuming the non-taxable portion. She may also be given
a special power of appointment during life and at her death, if
this is desired.
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LIFETIME GIFTS
LIFETIME EXEMPTION:

Under present law there is a gift tax exemption of $30,000.
This means that any individual may give away $30,000 during his
lifetime.
ANNUAL EXCLUSIONS:

In addition he may give away $3,000 each year to as many
donees as he wants (provided the gifts are of a present rather
than a future interest).
GIFT TAX MARITAL DEDUCTION:

If married, he may deduct one-half of any gift made to his wife.
Thus if he gives her $100,000 he deducts $50,000 as a marital deduction, $30,000 as his lifetime exemption, and $3,000 as his exclusion, paying tax on $17,000.
GIFT SPLITTING:

If he is married he may split any gift to a third person, with
his wife. Thus if he gives his son $100,000, he may treat $50,000
as having been given by him and $50,000 as being given by his
wife. Each has an exemption of $30,000 and an exclusion of $3,000.
Here the tax is computed as though he gave $17,000 and his wife
$17,000. But note that if any gifts are split all must be split.
Assume W has used $15,000 of her exemption, H, none of his.
H gives his son $51,000 thinking he is thereby exhausting both of
their exemptions ($45,000) plus using their annual exclusions
($6,000). Each, however, is treated as having made a gift of
$25,500. This comes within his exclusion and exemption, leaving
$7,500 of his lifetime exemption unused. He may deduct from W's
half her $3,000 and her remaining $15,000, which leaves $7,500
subject .to tax.
What he could have done was to have made a gift this December of $36,000 using part of his exemption and exhausting hers.
Then next he could give the balance and charge it all against his
exemption by electing not to split, since there is a new election
each year.
RELATION OF GIFT TAXES TO ESTATE TAXES:

The gift tax rates are fixed at exactly three-quarters of the
estate tax rates. This, however, does not mean that a lifetime
gift saves only twenty-five percent of the potential estate tax. The
saving will always be very much larger than this because of the
$30,000 gift tax exemption, the $3,000 annual gift tax exclusion per
donee, the gift tax marital deduction where available, the gift splitting privilege which doubles the exemption and exclusions, and
most important the fact that the property transferred is removed
from the highest estate tax bracket but taxed at the lowest gift
tax bracket. Thus an unmarried donor with an estate of $200,000
who gives $50,000 to two donees will incur gift tax of $705, but
will avoid potential estate taxes of $15,000 plus estimated administration expenses of $2,500. Thus the gift will save him $17,000.
GIFTS IN CONTEMPLATION OF DEATH:

But at .50 or 55 the average estate owner has little interest in
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saving death taxes. He has twenty-five years of good living ahead
and he remembers the depression of the early thirties. The reason
he has $200,000 is that he has never willingly parted with anything.
His reaction to a gift of $50,000 to save $17,000 of death costs is
that this is something he can do just as well 10 or 15 years from
now. Generally the client who is prepared to make really substantial gifts is somewhere between 75 and 80, his health leaves
much to be desired, he has finally resigned himself to the inevitable. But a lifelong business instinct to buy everything at reduced
prices is still strong. He wants the cost of dying to be kept at a
minimum.
Your first reaction as his advisor is that any transfer by him
is surely to be found to be in contemplation of death. What of it?
A gift in contemplation of death is not a crime. Even if it were
our donor would not be around to be put in jail at the time when
the transaction is first examined. Are there any undesirable consequences that should cause us to hesitate to make gifts in contemplation of death? I hope to convince you that in practically
all cases the estate owner will be better off by making such gifts.
FACTORS FAVORING GIFTS IN CONTEMPLATION

OF DEATH:

(a) Three-Year Limitation: It is surprising how many people
who are 80 live to be 83. This is particularly true of the group
we are talking about-those with substantial bank balances. There
is always a chance that your donor will outlive the three-year
statutory period. If he does the Government cannot tax the gift as
one in contemplation of death no matter how clear the evidence.
Here is where we add the Doctor to the traditional estate planning
team. If he can keep the old gentleman alive for three years, he
will be home tax free.
(b) Litigation Possibilities: The Government has never been
successful in contemplation of death cases. Taxpayers usually pay
and sue for refund in the district court in order to get a jury.
And the juries have been good to the taxpayers. In the Heiner case'
Justice Stone pointed out that the Government had been successful
in winning only about 20% of the cases that went to trial. Thus
even if the decedent dies within the three years, all is not lost.
John Wannamaker gave away $1,000,000 at 90 and the jury found
I Heiner
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he was not thinking about death and taxes when he did it.
(c) Settlement Possibilities: Because of the Government's lack
of success in these cases the Service is eager to compromise. In
the Horlick case2 $8,000,000 of stock was given to the children. The
Commissioner included it as a gift in contemplation of death.
After some negotiation the taxpayer consented to a proposed deficiency of $4,000,000 on account of the gift. This was a pure compromise. It was not clear whether it was arrived at by valuing
the total stock at half its value or by treating half of the property
as given in contemplation and half not. On its face the latter
position would seem absurd. Since it was all given the same day,
it is a little difficult to see how he could have been motivated by
thoughts of dying as to half the shares and not as to the other half.
But the Commissioner has authority to settle cases whenever
there is substantial doubt as to the law or the facts. Whenever
there are risks that the case may be decided either way, he can
settle on a fair appraisal of these risks.^ But compromises like the
Horlick case do not represent the usual approach.
Every estate tax return will have in it a number of questionable
items. There may be gifts in each of the three years immediately
preceding death. Here, depending on the strength of the arguments,
the taxpayer may yield on the last or last two gifts in exchange for
an agreement not to include the first.
In every state there will be valuation problems. Reasonable
minds may differ considerably as to the value of the closely held
stock or unimproved real estate. Assume the Commissioner is arguing for a $200,000 valuation of the stock in the family business, the taxpayer for a figure around $125,000. This can only be
settled by each side giving a little. In this type situation it is
extremely comforting to have a contemplation-of-death gift. Even
if a weak case it will furnish a powerful bargaining weapon in settling the other issues. The taxpayer may concede the gift as in
contemplation of death in exchange for a low value. Or he may
concede a high value if the gift is omitted.
In either event the fact that the gift was made will result in
very substantial reduction in estate taxes, if the matter is compromised.
2Horlick

Court

v. Kuhl, 45-2 USTC

§ 10, 228; 62 Fed Supp. 168.
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(d) Cases That Cannot Be Settled: There ma'y be gifts so clearly
prompted by thoughts of death that no compromise is possible and
the taxpayer either concedes the issue or loses after litigation. Even
in these extreme cases the gift in contemplation of death will prove
profitable because of the peculiar wording of the statutory provisions. You get a kind of double deduction that can best be illustrated by an example:
SAVING INVOLVED IN GIFTS IN CONTEMPLATION OF DEATH:

1. Net Taxable Estate-

$400,000
-----------------............
----

94,500
...-------------- -Estate Tax ----------------------........-------------$305,500
Passes to H eir -------------....-------------.-----..
.
$400,000
2. Net Estate -----------------------------------.......
Gift to Heir

Gift Tax
Total

-..-.-............
$200,000

-------------

31,000

--------------------------------

231,000
$169,000

$169,000
Net Estate at Death -----Inclusion of Gift in
Contemplation of
200,000
Death
Net Taxable Estate
----------- $369,000
____$84,900
Estate Tax -----------------Less Gift Tax Credit

-----31,000

Total Tax Payable

Net Estate at Death

-

53,900

------------------

Tax after Credit ................-

$169,000
53,900

$115,110
P asses to H eir on D eath ..................................................- $115,100
200,000
Passes by Inter Vivos Gift -------------------------------------------$315,100
SUMMARY
Property Passing to Heir, Partly by Gift in Contem$315,100
plation of Death, Partly by Will ----------------------------Property Passing to Heir by W ill -------------------------------------305,500

$ 9,600
Difference --------------------------------------------------------You always save an amount equal to the top estate tax bracket
on the amount of gift tax incurred.
FORM OF GIFT:

To remove the property from the estate of a donor the gift
must be complete. This means that he may not reserve a life estate,
either in the form of the income from or the use of the property.
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He may not retain any power to amend or revoke the gift or change
the beneficiaries. While -remote possibilities of reverter do not
have the same disastrous effect they once had the only sensible
transfer is one that completely divorces the donor from any
interest in or control over the property.
It is possible under the new Code to delay the possession and
enjoyment of the donee. Frequently donors are willing to give,
provided their donees do not get the use of the property until the
donor's death-they want to retain the satisfactions that belong
to the holder of the family purse strings. Under the 1954 Code
you may create a trust with directions in the trustee to accumulate
the income until the death of the donor, without adverse tax
consequences.
JOINT OWNERSHIP:

Joint Tenancies between spouses provide no tax advantages.
There may or may not be tax disadvantages.
No gift taxes need be paid- on the creation of joint tenancies
between spouses of real estate. The full value of the property will
be included in the estate of the spouse who paid the purchase
price and the surviving spouse will then get a new cost basis.
Thus many of the tax objections to joint tenancies of real estate
between spouses that existed prior to 1954 have been eliminated
and there will be many cases where it will be desirable to own
the family residence jointly with right of survivorship.
Once you get beyond the family residence individual ownership is preferable. Gift taxes are payable on the creation of joint
tenancies of personal property with no estate tax advantage. Further they create a risk of over qualifying property for the marital
deduction. Thus if H and W own $200,000 of securities purchased
by H, the tax on his death is only $4,800 because of the marital
deduction. But on W's later death it will be $32,700. If he owned
them individually and left them to W under the type of will we
have been discussing the combined taxes on both deaths would
only be $9,600 instead of $37,500.
Another objection to jointly owned property and one frequently overlooked is the difficulty of establishing who paid the
purchase price. Over the years H and W may pool their resources
and buy securities with the excess over expenses each year. Assume that in a particular year H received a $10,000 bonus. W inherited $8,000 from an Uncle. Fortune having struck them they
buy a new car, take a trip to Europe, and refurnish the living room.
These items cost $9,000, the balance goes into stock. Whose money
paid for what. Where both work or have incomes, imagine the
difficulty of tracing stock purchases made from joint accounts,
where some of the securities have been held for 15 or 20 years.
The effect of the presumption that the entire purchase was paid
by the decedent means, in many cases, the full value will be included
in the estate of whichever spouse dies first because of the inability
of the survivor to sustain the burden of proof the statute thrusts
upon him.
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GIFTS OF PRESENT AND FUTURE INTERESTS:

Adults: To obtain the $3,000 annual exclusion the gift must
be of a present interest. That means the donee must be given
something he can presently enjoy. If the income is to be accumulated or if it may be accumulated in the discretion of the trustee
or if it may be sprayed among two orthree beneficiaries the exclusion will be denied. Further a gift in trust of $3,000 will not
get the full exclusion since it is in part a gift of a future interest.
Only the right to the income is a present interest. How much this
right to the income is worth will depend on the age of the donee
since the value of his right is measured by his life expectancy.
Infants: Prior to the new Code there was substantial doubt
whether any gift in trust to an infant would qualify. Congress has
now provided that if the trust income and principal may be expended for the infant and if it will pass to him or his estate at
21 or is subject to a general power of appointment, the exclusion
shall not be denied because of his infancy. But this may be paying
too high a price for the exclusion. Generally it is not possible
to foresee what kind of person the infant will be at 21 and whether
it will be in his best interests to have the property forced upon him.
As a generalization too much attention is given to obtaining
the $3,000 exclusions. They require the sacrifice of too many
sound family objectives and income tax saving techniques to
justify the slight saving in gift taxes they achieve.
SELECTION OF PROPERTY:

The most talked about property for gift purposes today is
life insurance. A gift of life insurance policies under the new law
has much to recommend it. The donor feels no poorer, his donee
no richer. The gift tax cost is small. What is removed from the
estate is large.
Thus a gift of a $100,000 policy with a $20,000 cash surrender
value has a gift tax value of only slightly more than $20,000 but
it removes $100,000 from the taxable estate. There are some pitfalls to avoid. Gifts of insurance policies are almost certain to
be found to be in contemplation of death. If the donor survives
the three-year period he is safe. But the payment of premiums may
also constitute gifts in contemplation of death. If the donor continues to pay the premiums, the insurance purchased with the
last three premiums will probably be included in his estate. Therefore, it is wise to give the oldest policies. Thus if a policy is 20
years old at the date of gift and the donor pays 6 premiums thereafter, only 3/26 of the face is includible. Whereas if he had purchased a new policy 3/6s or 50% of the face amount would be includible. It may also be wise to use the old policies because Congress may again change the law to reinstate the premium payment
test. But, based on past experience, it will not be retroactive.
Don't give policies on which there are existing loans. These
gifts are going to cause trouble since it is not impossible that the
donor-borrowers will be found to have retained an incident of
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ownership in the policies given. The regulations define an incident
of ownership as an economic interest in the policy. If the policy
serves as the primary source of repayment of the donor's obligation it is not too far fetched to say that he has an economic interest
in it.
COST BASIS CONSIDERATIONS:

For purposes of gain on a later sale of gift property the donee
takes his donor's cost basis. For purposes of loss he takes the
lower of his donor's cost or market value at date of gift. Assume
our donor has three stocks, each of which has a present value of
$100. Stock X cost $10, Y $90, and Z $150. If he gives X stock
his donee is burdened with a large potential capital gains tax. If
he gives Z a valuable capital loss deduction may be wasted since
the loss will no longer be available to the donor and his donee
will have a $100 basis for loss purposes. Here, absent other considerations, the Y stock may be preferable. The cost basis factor
will always be important where the asset is depreciable. How important it will be in other situations will vary with the likelihood
that the asset may not be indefinitely retained by the donee.
Generally speaking low basis property should be retained to
become a part of the donor's estate for then the angel of death
will give it a stepped-up basis i.e., market value at the date of
the owner's death. High basis property should be sold by the donor
and the proceeds given, thus obtaining for the donor the benefit
of the tax loss.
There will be times when low basis property should be given.
Thus if Father, whose income is substantial, is about to sell stock
which cost him $10,000, for $40,000, he faces a capital gains tax
of $7,500. By giving the stock to his three children, who then sell
it, the capital gains tax may be as low as $2,040. This is so because
the children represent three separate tax paying entities, each
with $600 exemptions and each starting at the beginning rates. If
the children have other income only slightly less savings may be
realized through transferring the stocks to separate trusts for the
children.
GIFT OF FUTURE INCOME:

No income tax shifting occurs when the property given represents merely a right to future income. If a bond, a capital asset,
is given the interest thereafter earned is taxable to the donee. But
a donor may not transfer the tax on the later interest by cutting
off the coupons and giving them while he retains the bond. To
borrow the analogy of Mr. Justice Holmes the fruit continues to
be taxable to the owner of the tree. This fruit-tree doctrine has
made it impossible to shift the tax liability on earnings, past or
future. It effectively prevents assignments of next year's bonus
or of fees or commissions, earned but not yet paid. Nor will gifts
of next year's trust income, or future rents or dividends be recognized for tax purposes.
On the other hand it is well settled that if a capital asset is
given the tax on the later received income will fall on the donee.
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This is true even though much of the gain is attributable to the
period when the property was still in the hands of the donor. Stock
may be given away just before an extraordinary cash dividend is
to be paid. The entire capital gain on a capital asset that cost the
donor $10, was worth $90 when given, and is sold for $100, is
taxable solely to the donee. These rules frequently furnish substantial tax saving opportunities.
There is one exception to the general rule that gifts of future
income will not be recognized for tax purposes. A 10-year trust,
income to the donees, capital to return to the donor at the end
of the 10-year period will under the new Code, effectively shift
the tax to the donee. This offers attractive savings to limited
groups who have no real interest in estate tax savings or who
hesitate to part irrevocably and finally with their capital. The
relatively young man of wealth, the high salaried executive with
limited capital, the individual whose principal source of income
is a life estate in real property or a trust; none of these people
are immediately troubled by death taxes. They are looking only
for relief from the heavy burden of high income tax brackets.
To take a concrete example: Jones is a top executive with
salary of $60,000 and capital assets of $150,000. He is married and
55 years of age. Once he retires his capital and the income it
produces will be really important to him. But at the moment the
heavy income tax drain ($3,600 after the dividend credit on the
$6,000 his capital produces) is his big concern. He can create,
under the new Code provisions, three 10-year trusts of his capital,
income to be accumulated for his three children or used to pay
insurance premiums on policies on their lives, corpus to be returned
to him at 65 and the accumulations or the policies delivered to his
children. Such a gift -has a gift tax value of about $45,000-well
within his and his wife's lifetime exemptions. The trusts over the
10-year period will pay in income taxes $9,600 whereas if he retains
the assets during this period he will pay in taxes $36,000. Thus
he can build for his children a fund of $50,000 at net loss of income
to him of $24,000.
It may be well to conclude with the suggestions that all substantial gifts should be to trusts rather than outright.
USE OF A TRUST:

1. Avoids estate taxes on the deaths of the donees. Remember the example of the wealthy industrialist who gave the stock
to his wife and got it back a few years later by inheritance but
only after the Government collected $114,000 in taxes.
2. Trusts offer tremendous income tax savings possibilities.
They serve as second tax pocketbooks. Create separate trusts for
each primary beneficiary in order to have several tax entities. Authorize the trustee to purchase insurance on the lives of the beneficiaries. This will make the portion used taxable to him. Give
the trustees discretionary power to spray the income among the
family and thereby keep it in the lowest tax brackets.
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NON-CONFORMING USES: PROBLEMS AND METHODS
OF ELIMINATION
BY SANFORD

B. HERTZ, Of the Denver and Michigan Bars

INTRODUCTION

In light of the recent property-use regulations set forth in the
new city zoning ordinance, an examination of the various problems raised by such change became pertinent. The growth of a
city promulgates revision and planning and, "City planning is the
best tool available for re-forming the physical machinery of the
modern city to accommodate it to its new functions and to gear
into the city technological changes which make for a more orderly,
economical, convenient, and productive municipal corporation."'
Thus, only through city planning, and specifically through zoning,
can we achieve the advantages secured from a well planned community.2
Despite the progress of zoning, it has not yet reached the desired expectation of its advocates? We must attempt to see what
are some of the difficulties which stand in the way of effective administration of modern zoning ordinances. One difficulty, and by
far the most serious, is the continuation of the non-conforming use
without any effective provision for its elimination.4 Until some
method is devised to permanently eliminate the non-conforming
use from our cities and towns, effective city planning cannot be
achieved.
There has been much effort extended toward the solution of
this problem. Writers and city managers have suggested many
methods which would eventually, if legislated by councils and
sustained by the courts, eliminate the non-conforming use from our
society. Among the suggested solutions are: (1) Elimination by
condemnation through eminent domain; (2) Provisions for abandonment, both voluntary and involuntary; (3) Limiting the extension and repair of the non-conforming use; (4) Immediate elimination without compensation; and (5) Gradual elimination over a

IOppermann,

"Non-Conforming Use and the City Plan," 15 J. of LAND & P. U. ECON. 96
(1939).
2 Zoning regulations have been adopted in over 583 cities and towns which represents a populotion of over 31,000,000 people. For a short article on the growth of zoning see, Chamberlain,
"Zoning Progress," 15 A.B.A.J. 535 (1929).
-Bettman, "A Backward Step in Zoning," 16 J. LAND & P. U. ECON. 455 (1940); Tugwell,
"The Real Estate Dilemma," 2 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 27 (1942); 35 VA. LAW REV. 348 (1949).
SThe non-conforming use is defined in almost all zoning ordinances as a building or land
occupied by a use which does not comply with the regulations of the use district in which it is
situated. Chicago Munic. Code, (Hader, 1939) § 194 A-2 (n). See Bartholomew, "The Zoning of II.
Municipalities," 17 ILL. MUNIC. REV. 221, 232 (1938) where the author states, "It has always
been assumed that non-conforming uses would gradually eliminate themselves from the district
in which they exisit if they were not permitted to expand. Such has not proven to be the case."
See also 1 YOKLEY, ZONING LAW AND PRACTICE, § 148 (1953). For a good analysis of the
shortcomings of zoning see, MacLaurin, "Where Zoning Fails," 17 NAT. MUNI. REV. 257 (1928).
Some authority has questioned whether the problem of eliminating the non-conforming use is
necessary. For such an article stating why elimination should not be mandatory see, 102 PA. L.
REV. 91 (1953). However, for the purpose of this article, it must be assumed that the elimination
of the non-conforming use is not merely desirable but a necessity to effective city planning. As a
legal problem when the legislature zones uses into various districts it is the task of the court to
enforce these ordinances within constitutional bounds. The writer firmly believes that a non-conforming use in any district is a menace to city planning-like a fly in the ointment; some methods,
which will be discussed in detail subsequently, must be found to eliminate this problem.
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period of years-generally called "amortization." The major portion of this paper will be concerned with a study of the legal and
social problems which present themselves when one or more of the
above methods are considered for adoption.
VALIDITY OF ZONING IN GENERAL

Zoning finds its validity in the reasonable exercise of the
police power;5 a zoning ordinance may be justified if it protects
the health, safety, and morals of the community. Zoning ordinances
are no different from other police power regulations; however,
they, too, require reasonableness and fairness in application: their
reasonableness being a test of their legality.'
The leading case in this area is the historic decision of Euclid v.
Amber Realty Co.' The Supreme Court here unequivocally upheld the right of a city to pass a comprehensive zoning ordinance
and to enforce it, even though some of the consequences would be
to thrust a heavy financial loss upon property owners. This decision has since been followed by a majority of the states.8 Also
because of this decision zoning has received wide acceptance in
our cities and towns. However, a municipality in the absence of
an enabling statute has no authority to establish a comprehensive
zoning ordinance.' It is only upon a delegated right by statute,
and a reasonable exercise of such right, directed toward promoting
the health, safety, and morals of a community, that a municipal
corporation can put into effect a comprehensive zoning system.
Our discussion thus far has concerned only the traditional
zoning ordinance which controls the future use of property. But
what of the zoning ordinance which attempts the removal of already existing enterprises, which because of their existence, hinder
the realization of some plan for a better organized community.
These are the types of ordinances and the problems arising from
such ordinances to which we shall now turn our attention. We must
first, however, distinguish between the traditional nuisance and
the non-conforming use in the context of methods which may be
utilized to eliminate them from our communities. Specifically. are
any differences in the treatment which must be accorded to these
uses of property required by the courts to satisfy traditional concepts of due process?
NUSIANCE DISTINGUISHED FROM NoN-CONFORMING USE

No greater fallacy could exist than that zoning is restricted to or is identical with nuisance regulation."''
Property

regulation by means of zoning is not restricted to what is dis5

Village of Euclid v. Amber Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 47 S.Ct. 114 (1926). 1 YOKLEY, ZONING LAW AND PRACTICE, § 1 (1953); BAKER, THE LEGAL ASPECTS OF ZONING, p. 113 (1922);
8 McQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS, J 25.05 (1950). See also Freud, "Som
Problems in
the Law of Zoning," 24 ILL. LAW REV. 135 (1924); Anderson, "Zoning in Minnesota-Eminent Domain v. Police Power," 16 NAT. MUN. REV. 624 (1927). For a collection of the cases see, I
YOKLEY, ZONING LAW AND PRACTICE,
20, note 14 (1953).
6People v. Scrafano, 307 Mich. 655, 12 N.W. (2d) 325 (1943); Kinney v. City of Joliet, 411
Ill. 289, 103 N.E. (2d) 473 (1952). See Byrne, "The Constitutionality of a General Zoning Ordi.
nance," 11 MARQUETTE L. REV. 189 (1926).
'272 U.S. 365, 47 S.Ct. 114 (1926).
OThe cases are collected in 1 YOKLEY, ZONING LAW AND PRACTICE, §§ 20-22 (1953).
State v. DuBose, 99 Fla. 812, 128 So. 4 (1930); Wertheimer v. Schwab, 124 Misc. 822, 210
N.Y. Supp. 312 (1925).
'0 City of Los Angeles v. Gage,
(Cal. App. 1954), 274 P. (2d) 34, ably noted in 53 MICH. L.
REV. 762 (1955). See Bettmon, "Constitutionality of Zoning," 37 HARV. L. REV. 834, 841 (1924).
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orderly or offensive. Zoning not only includes, but supplements,
nuisance regulation. Zoning, therefore, is a much broader concept
than nuisance abatement. Although there is a similarity in the
problem of eliminating the non-conforming user and the abatement
of the nuisance, the achievement of each must be handled in a
different manner.
Traditionally, certain uses of property which were classified
as nuisances could be abated immediately and drastically.- Thus,
if it were possible to get the non-conforming use into the category
of a common law nuisance, the court could abate that nuisance,
despite the fact that great property losses would be incurred. Here
again we must determine when a particular use is a common law
nuisance, and when it is merely a statutory non-conforming use.
The line separating these two classifications is not clear. Generally, at common law a nuisance was some noxious, offensive,
detrimental use of land which caused some physical damage to
the property of others. 12 When such a use existed, abatement followed almost as a matter of course. Abatement was allowed where
livery stables were maintained in certain areas, "3 or where
11Brown v. Grant, (Tex. Civ. 1928), 2 S.W. (2d) 285. Noel, "Retroactive Zoning and Nuisances,"
41 COL. L. REV. 457 (1941); 1951 WIS. L. REV 685.
=Generally a public nuisance is created by any enterprise which endangers the health,
safety or property of a considerable number of persons. See MILLER, CRIMINAL LAW, 1 132 (1934).
The enterprise will constitute a private nusiance, giving rise to a civil action for damages, whenever it interferes with the use and enoyment of private' land. See 4 RESTATEMENT, TORTS, c. 40
(1939); Noel, "Retroactive Zoning and Nuisances," 41 COL. LAW REV. 457 (1941).
IsReinman v. Little Rock, 237 U.S. 171, 35 S.Ct. 511 (1915).
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premises were used as a brickkiln,'14 or where a large brewery
was maintained in a residential area. 15 The Supreme Court in
these cases was careful to point out that the right to eliminate
prior use of property was one which would be narrowly limited,
and the exercise of such right would be carefully scrutinized by
the courts.16
The leading American case which distinguished the nuisance
from the ordinary non-conforming user was Jones v. City of Los
Angeles." The court said that " . . . the distinction between the

power to prohibit nuisances and the power to zone is exceedingly
important. The power over nuisances is more circumscribed in its
objects; but once an undoubted menace to public health, safety or
morals is shown, the method of protection may be drastic."' 8 The
court was rather categorical in its analysis of the problem, determining that a zoning statute which is retroactive 9 would be struck
down unless it eliminated that which was a nuisance; it rested its
decision on the theory that such a zoning ordinance was an "unreasonable use of the police power." Cases from other jurisdictions
and legal writers support2 0 this distinction between the nuisance and
the non-conforming use.
In addition to ascertaining when a common law nuisance does
in fact exist, we must determine whether the same treatment accorded the common law nuisance can be applied to a nuisance so
designated by statute. This problem involves the study of two
questions: (1) Does the fact that a use does not conform to the
ordinance ipso facto make it a nuisance, and (2) Will the statutory
declaration that a use is a nuisance allow the court to apply the
principles so frequently utilized in abating common law nuisances?
The great weight of authority seems to hold that merely because a use does not comply with the zoning requirement, i.e., is
non-conforming, does not in itself make it a nuisance.' Unless the
use was a nuisance under common law doctrines, or perhaps made
1'Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394, 36 S.Ct. 143 (1915). For a more detailed discussion
of this case see infra.
5
1 Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 8 S.Ct. 273 (1887).
16 In O'Reilly, "The Non-conforming Use and Due Process of Law," 23 GEO. L. J. 218, 225
(1935), the author in discussion of these cases said ...
" It is notable that in each of the in.
stances cited, the prohibited use contained an element of common low nuisance in that it was
the cause of physical annoyance and discomfort to neighboring landowners or to the community
at large.
."
(Emphasis Supplied).
17211 Cal. 304, 295 P. 14 (1930).
IsIbid p. 316.
It is questionable whether the term "retroactive" as used by the court in the Jones Case
is technically correct. Retroactive traditionally means an application of a present statute which
extends in effect to acts done prior to enactment. The statute in the Jones Case, upon close examinotion, seems only to deal with the future use of property, i.e. "it shall be unlawful for any
person, firm or corporation to erect, establish, operate, maintain or conduct any hospital, asylum.
. ." (Emphasis
.
Supplied). Although the use of the term "retroactive" is not -technically correct,
perhaps the court used this to fortify their reasoning that the ordinance was invalid. In an effort to protect the vested property rights of the people, this term may 'have been utilized; for
to convince a court that an ordinance is retroactive is a big step to a successful attack on this
ordinance. This, however, is only speculation why the courts use this term; the fact still remains
that they do use it.
m°Adams v. Kalamazoo Ice and Fuel Co., 245 Mich. 261, 222 N.W. 86 (1928); Pelham View
Apartments, Inc. v. Switzer, 130 Misc. 545, 224 N.Y. Supp. 56 (1927). WILLIAMS, LAW OF CITY
PLANNING AND ZONING, § 201 (1922); METZENBAUM, LAW OF ZONING, § 287 (1930).
21 Keenly v. McCarty, 137 Misc. 524, 244 N.Y. Supp. 63 (1930); Webb v. Alexander, 202 Go.
436, 43 S.E. (2d) 668 (1947). 8 McQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS, § 25.11 (1950).
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so by legislative fiat, it cannot be abated or treated as one upon
the sole ground that it does not comply with the zoning regulaitons.22
This immediately presents our second and more difficult question. The authorities seem to indicate that the legislature may
within constitutional bounds declare certain uses to be nuisances
even though they were not such at common law.12 This, however,
is not unlimited; the legislative directive that a certain use is a
nuisance must not be arbitrary nor can it be used without thought
to protecting the health, safety or morals of the community.2 4 The
statutory enlargement of the common law nuisance will generally
be sustained only upon the showing that the user is causing some
physical harm to the property of others. "1 Thus, unless some oi Tne
elements of the common law nuisance are present, the legislature
has no right to declare any particular use to be a nuisance. This
requirement, surely justifiable, emphasizes the problem of eliminating the non-conforming use which is not a nuisance. The state
of the law seems to be that if someting is a nuisance, either at
common law or within the constitutional bounds of statutory declaration, it can be abated immediately without any invasion of
constitutional rights.
Our attention must now be drawn to the ordinance which attempts the elimination of certain land use which by hypothesis is
not a nuisance, either under traditional common law doctrines or
by statutory declaration. -Assume a particular user of land is legitimate and legal; subsequently, a zoning ordinance is passed which
makes such user invalid in that area and attempts to eliminate
this particular use of land. Should this type of provision be
upheld by the courts as a reasonable exercise of the police power?
In the enabling acts of most jurisdictions there is no provision
concerning the treatment of the non-conforming use.26 In these
states the rights of the owners of the non-conforming use are governed purely by judicial application of constitutional restraints. In
examining these constitutional restraints, we must determine how
effectively they have preserved the property rights of owners who
5 But compare State ex rel. Demo Realty Co. v. Jacoby, 168 La. 752, 123 So. 314 (1929) and
State ex rel. Demo Realty Co. v. McDonald, 168 La. 172, 121 So. 613 (1929), where the court held
a use may be a nuisance because it does not comply- with the zoning ordinance. For a more detailed discussion of these cases see infro.
0 Leigh v. City of Wichita, 148 Kn. 607, 83 P. (2d) P. 644 (1938); York Harbor Village Corporation v. Libby, 126 Me. 537, 140 AtI. 382 (1928). JOYCE, NUISANCES, § 81 (1906); 8 McQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS, § 25.11 (1950). See 119 A.L.R. 1503 (1939) for a helpful annotation.
24 In Lawton v. Steele, 119 N.Y. 226 at p. 233, 23 N.E. 878 (1890) the court said
the
legislature cannot use it (statutory declaration of a nuisance) as a cover for withdrawing property
from the protection of the law, or arbitrarily, where no public right or interest is involved, declare property a nuisance for the purpose of devoting it to destruction. If the court can judicially
see the statute is a mere invasion, or was framed for the purpose of individual oppression, it
will set it aside as unconstitutional but not otherwise." (Emphasis supplied).
2, Lawton v. Steele, 119 N.Y. 226, 23 N.E. 878 (1890); State v. Noyes, 30 N.H. 279 (1855;
Commonwealth v. Howe, 13 Gray (79 Mass.) 26 (1859). See cases cited in notes 13, 14, 15 supra.
'oAla. Code Ann. (1940), tit. 37, §§ 772-785; Ark. Stat. Ann. (1947), tit. 19, §§ 2801 et
seq.; Col. Gen. Laws (1944) act. 994; Colo. Stat. Ann. (1935), c. 26; Conn. Rev. Gen. Stat. (1949),
c. 43; Del. Rev. Code (1935), c. 179; Iowa Code (1950), c. 358 A; Okla. State (1941), tit. 11,
*1 401-410. But see Ill. Rev. Stat. (Cahill, 1927) c. 24, par. 521; Mass. Gen. Laws, (1921) c. 40,
I 29; N.J. Rev. Stat. (1937), tit. 40 § 55.48, for statutes expressly providing that the non-con-forming use should not be eliminated.
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by ordinance find themselves maintaining non-conforming uses.
The courts traditionally hold that the elimination of priorexisting uses is an unreasonable and unjustifiable exercise of the
police power.2 Thus, upon the theory that the application of such
a zoning ordinance would impair the owner's vested right, the attempted elimination of non-conforming uses has been denied.Some courts have nevertheless gone a long way in giving effect
to the ordinance which requires the elimination of the non-conforming use. These courts have generally accomplished this by
classifying the non-conforming use as a nuisance, and then relying
upon traditional common law methods to immediately abate such
nuisance. This type of treatment has been utilized in numerous
cases by the Louisiana Court. Although the opinion was not clear,
the court seemed to uphold the almost immediate elimination of a
small grocery store on the theory that 'it was a nuisance. 29 When a
-Jones v. City of Los Angeles, 211 Col. 304, 295 P. 14 (1930); Adams v. Kalamazoo Ice &
Fuel Co., 245 Mich. 261, 222 N.W. 86 (1928); Pierritti v. Johnson, 132 N.J.L. 576, 41 A. (2d) 896
(1945). See WILLIAMS. LAW OF CITY PLANNING & ZONING, § 201 (1922); METZENBAUM, LAW
OF ZONING, § 287 (1930). See also, 39 YALE L.J. 735 (1930); Young, "City Planning & Restrictions
on the Use of Property," 9 MINN. L. REV. 593 (1925). For cases which base their prime rejection of these ordinances on the theory that it deprives a property owner of his vested property
rights see, Cassel Realty Co. v. City of Omaha et ol., 144 Neb. 753, 14 N.W. (2d) 600 (1944);
Building Height Cases, 181 Wis. 519, 195 N.W. 544 (1923), discussed in 1951 WIS. L. REV. 685.
Perhaps it would be wise at this point to mention the distinction between the attempted elimination of non-conforming uses by means of the police power, and of their elimination by use of
eminent domain. In some instances zoning has been effectuated through condemnation, compensation being provided to owners for property "taken." See generally, METZENBAUM, THE LAW OF
ZONING (1930;. This is discussed in greater detail infra.
SSee 102 PA. L. REV. 91 (1953).
v. New Orleans, 154 La. 271, 97 So. 440 (1923).
'Civello

Back of Colorado Real Estate Investment Since 1898
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zoning ordinance provided for the elimination of dress shop, the
Louisiana Supreme Court again upheld the ordinance on the theory
that such use was noxious and offensive.8 0 The court in this case
seemed to assume the constitutionality of the ordinance, even
though this was the very issue to be decided. Again, in the Dema
Realty Cases' the Louisiana Court upheld the elimination of a
drug store and a grocery store upon the theory that such user was
a nuisance.2 2 The reasoning in these cases should be and has been
criticized." Fortunately, the general rule still remains that the
legislature cannot declare a user a nuisance merely because it violates the zoning statute-some other elements must be present.2
Perhaps a more cogent way to specifically point up the differences between the elimination of the non-conforming use which is
a nuisance and the non-conforming use which is not a nuisance can
be best demonstrated by a contrast between the Jones v. City of
Los Angeles 325and the Hadacheck v. Sebastion" cases.
In the Hadacheck Case the land owner had been using his
property for the manufacture of bricks for a good number of years;
he specifically purchased the property because of the rich deposits
of clay under the land. The land was outside the limits of the city,
distant from other habitations when he erected expensive machinery for the manufacture of these bricks. The City of Los Angeles
subsequently passed a zoning ordinance which prohibited any person from establishing or operating a brickkiln within the area
owned by the petitioner. The petitioner asserted that to apply this
zoning ordinance to him would deprive him of his property without due process of law. In spite of the fact, as recognized by the
court, that the petitioner would suffer great property loss, the court
upheld the ordinance, specifically relying on the effect that such
a business had upon the health and comofrt of the community.
Thus the court allowed the immediate elimination of the non-conforming use, finding it somewhat akin to the common law nuisance.
However, when we turn to the Jones Case, we are faced with
a similar problem, and yet the court arrives at a different result.
Here an ordinance attempted to prohibit the establishment and opperation of hospitals, asylums, and sanatoriums in certain designated areas. The court stated that the retroactive application was invalid as an unreasonable use of the police power. 7 The court said
that,

"

.

.

. It would be manifestly unjust to deprive the owner of

property of the use to which it was lawfully devoted when the ordinance became effective. ' ' "t This language of the court was not
SoIn Liberty Dvfess Shop v. New Orleans, 157 La. 26 at p. 27, 101 So. 798 (1924) the court
stated, "In such a neighborhood . . . any business establishment is a pib-ic nuisance, because,
if for no other reason, it is an example of defiance of the municipal government ....
0 State ex rel. Demo Realty Co. v. Jacoby, 168 La. 752. 123 So. 314 (1929); State ex ret.
Demo Realty Co. v. McDonald, 168 La. 172, 121 So. 613 (1929).
These ordinances did not demand immediate abatement, but provided a one year period
in which the user must be eliminated or be made to to conform. The problem of amortization
as a method to eliminate the non-conforming use will be discussed infra.
.O'Reilly,
"The Non-Conforming Use and Due Process of Law," 23 GEO. L.J. 218 (1935); 39
?ALE5 5 L.J. 735 (1930).
See note 21 supra.
s5211 Cal. 334, 295 P. 14 (1930).
8239 U.S. 394, 36 S.Ct. 143 (1915).
wSee note 19 supra.
Jones v. City of Los Angeles, 211 Cal. 304, 295 P. 14 (1930).
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meant to be as inclusive as it might seem, for the court went on to
say that if the use were a nuisance (it is not clear from the opinion
whether they meant common law or statutory) the destruction and
elimination of such use would be within the realm of "reasonableness" under the police power.
Thus these two decisions illustrate the difference in dealing
with a non-conforming use which is a nuisance, and with a us,
which is non-conforming but not a nuisance. If the non-conforming use is a nuisance, it may be immediately and drastically eliminated. On the other hand, if the non-conforming use is not a nuisance, neither at common law nor under permissible statutory defiintion, it cannot be immediately eliminated; other methods mus
be utilized to free a particular district from the continuation of
the non-conforming use.
Perhaps this distinction between the nuisance and the nonconforming use is an arbitrary one when determing "reasonableness" under the police power or attempting to come within the
traditional concepts of due process. The writer, however, feels that
to preserve the property rights of individuals some definitive device is desirable and in fact necessary. Although individual rights
must on many occasions give way to the general welfare of the
community, it is submitted that in the area of zoning: unreasonable
use of the police power is synonymous with immediate elimination
of a prior use which is not a nuisance.
This is not as revolutionary (or perhaps as reactionary) as it
may seem at first glance. It does not prevent the legislature from
utilizing other means of eliminating the non-conforming use-means
which both protect the private property owner and still achieve
the benefits of a well-planned community. Admittedly, the nonconforming use should be eliminated, but by means which do not
"take property without just compensation," nor by unreasonable
use of police power. Our discussion will now turn to the various
methods which have attempted to free zoned areas from the nonconforming use, methods which recognize the rights of the property owner while continuing to aim at the ultimate goal of zoning.
ELIMINATING THE NON-CONFORMING USE

T. Condemnation Through Eminent DomainAlthough the power to zone has been generally upheld under
the guise of the police power, in seeking to eliminate the nonconforming use we can utilize the power of eminent domain.' 9 In
our analysis of the power of eminent domain as a method to eliminate the non-conforming use we shall confine ourselves to two
basic questions: (1) The legal question of whether the use of eminent domain is within the scope of the constitutional power, and
(2) The policy question of whether in fact this is a feasible method,
assuming its legality, to eliminate the non-conforming use.
sMich.
section,

Comp Laws (1948),

cities and

villages

§ 125.583 a,..... ..

may acquire

In addition to the power granted

in this

by purchase,

condemnation or otherwise private property
structures. . . . The elimination of such non-conform-

far the removal of non-conforming uses and
ing uses and structures in a zone district as herein provided is hereby declared to be for a public
purpose and for a public use ...
"
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The right to condemn private property for public use is not
questioned. The significant problem in determining the constitutionality of statutes condemning non-conforming uses seems to
turn upon whether such taking is for the "public use." If we say
that the public at large will benefit because of this elimination, and
that the legislative intent, presumably for the public as a whole,
will be more effectively manifested, we might well conclude that
such condemnation is valid under the power of eminent domain.
Heretofore, the use of the
power of eminent domain for this pur4
pose has been held valid. '

One might suggest, however, that such a taking is not for the
public use as traditionally defined, but really for the benefit of
the other landowners within the zone. If the court finds that this
be the effect of the "taking," i.e., not for the public use but only
for a group of private landowners, then this method will be eliminated on constitutional grounds.4
It should be noted, however,
that even though private landowners in the zone will be directly
benefited, it may still be quite possible to say that the taking is
really for the public use. The intention of the legislature in passing such a zoning statute, coupled with this enabling power to
condemn the non-conforming use, is initially and fundamentally
done for the public as a whole. Merely because a small segment
of the community stands to benefit more directly than others
should not induce a court to say
that the taking is for private use
1
and therefore unconstitutional.

2

Recognizing this technical and difficult problem, without any
hope of arriving at a definite solution, we will now turn to the
question of whether condemnation is an effective and feasible
method of eliminating the non-conforming use. As a policy mat1vState ex reL Twin City B & I Co. v. Houghton, 144 Minn. 1, 176 N.W. 159 (1920). This
case has been cited with approval in Thomas v. Housing Authority of Duluth, 234 Minn. 221,
48 N.W. (2d) 175 (1951). See 8 A.L.R. 594 (1920). See also 10 NAT. MUNIC. REV. 519 (1921).
4'See Riverbank Improvement Co. v. Chadwick, 228 Mass. 242, 117 N.E. 244 (1917) where
the court found that a statute which extinguished the right of a restrictive covenant was merely
for the benefit of a private landowners and not for the public as a whole. The same reasoning
might well be applied where a zoning ordinance attempts to do the same. See 101 U. OF PA.
L. REV. 1246 (1953).
" In Kansas City v. Liebi. 298 Mo. 569, 593, 252 S.W. 404 (1923) the court said, "In order
to constitute a public use it is not necessary that the whole community or any part of it should
actually use or be benefited by a contemplated improvement; benefit to a considerable number
is sufficient. Nor does the mere fact that the advantage of a public improvement also inures
. deprive it of its public charaoter."
to a particular individual .
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ter, should a municipality use its power of eminent domain to rid
a particular area of non-conforming uses?
The attempt to use the power of eminent domain for purposes
of putting into operation a city plan has been severely critici7ed
by the authorities. 4"1 The sharpest criticism of this method is that
the expense of assessing the benefits and damages to every nonconforming use in a community makes eminent domain unworkable. 44 The inability of most municipalities to pay fair compensation
to every use they wish eliminated would defeat this method in its
inception. Even if a city were financially able to condemn and
compensate for a percentage of the non-conforming uses in any
particular area, this would not effectuate the purpose of the ordinance, i.e., complete elimination of all such uses. The excessive
cost of purchasing the land or the buildings would not be worth
the gain to the community. Although by this method all non-conforming uses would be immediately eliminated, it is quite impractical that this be used as the sole method of solving this problem.
The expense, however, is not the only hindrance to its successful operation. Extensive litigation would follow the use of such
method; spurious claims would be an almost immediate result. The
use of eminent domain would tend to fix a rigid mold on the city,
for each change would result in further litigation and a multitude
of problems. Thus for these reasons eminent domain, in the average situation, will not be a practical method to eliminate the nonforming use.
This power can, though, be used to advantage in particular situations to eliminate specific non-conforming uses which are exceedingly bothersome. Thus, where the gain to the comminity
would be well worth the cost of such condemnation, something
which could be determined by the zoning authorities, eminent domain could be exercised.45 Perhaps if a particular area has but
a few non-conforming uses, an immediate elimination by condemnation would be practicably wise and even possible. If this be
the situation, but surely we must recognize that it would be most

a

"No effective zoning plan could be accomplished by the exercise of eminent domain.
BASSETT, ZONING, p. 27 (1936).
4"BAKER, THE LEGAL ASPECTS OF ZONING, p. 113 (1927); Young, "City Planning and Restrictions on the Use of Property," 9 MINN. L. REV. 593, 595 (1925).
'" See,
1951 WIS. L. REV. 685 where the writer suggests that this method of eliminating nonconforming uses may be used to great advantage in rural areas than in urban ones.
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unusual if it were, then condemnation by means of eminent domain
would serve our purpose.
Keeping in mind the power of eminent domain as a supplementary method of resolving this problem, we must look further
to see if other solutions would afford a more practical and more
effective method.
II. Abandonment and Discontinuance, Both Voluntary and
InvoluntaryA. Voluntary
Another method used to extinguish a non-conforming use is to
provide in the ordinance that if such use has been discontinued for
a certain length of time the non-conforming use cannot be resumed. 6 Although the courts are bound by constitutional doctrines to respect the vest property rights of an individual, when
he voluntarily abandons such use, and the community is free of
the burden, he should not be allowed to resume the non-conforming use. Once a use is discontinued 47 any subsequent use of the
premises must be conforming. Our problem now becomes one of
determining when a court can say that a particular use has been
voluntarily abandoned.
Whether something has been abandoned depends .ipon the intention to abandon and upon some overt act or failure to act which
carries the implication of abandonment.4 8 The necessary intent to
show abandonment is indicated by a conversion from one use to
another;49 or if the owner razes his building he is under a legal
duty to make any new building conform to the ordinance; 50 or
where the owner removed his manufacturing equipment from the
plant the court held that this was sufficient to manifest the neces46 "No building or premises where a non-conforming use is discontinued for more than two
years . . . shall be devoted to any use that is prohibited in such district." Dayton, Ohio, Zoning
Ordinance § 210 cited in 102 PA. L. REV. 91, 100 (1953) and in 35 VA. L. REV. 348, 349 (1949).
See also, Wis. Stat. (1951), § 59.97(5). For an ordinance requiring as little as six months to effectuate a discontinuance see Orlando, Fla. Zoning Ord., § 9.
"tThe ordinances generally use the word "discontinued," but the courts have interpreted this
to mean "abandoned.'
See 35 VA. L. REV. 348, 351 (1949).
4'People ex rel. Delgado v. Morris, 334 III. App. 557, 79 N.E. (2d) 839 (1948); Dorman v.
Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 187 Md. 678, 51 A.(2d) 658 (1947). See 86 A.L.R. 689
(1933). See also, 8 McQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS, § 25. 192 (1950).
's Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Sprague,
(S.D.N.Y. 1933), 4 F. Supp. 499; Montclair v. Bryan, 16
N.J. Super. 535, 85 A.(2d) 231 (1951).
, Sitgreaves v. Board of Adjustment of Nutley, 136 N.J.L. 26, 54 A(2d) 451 (1947). See 8
McQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS, 9 25.194 (1950).

Best Wishes to the Bar Association

NEWTON OPTICAL COMPANY
GUILD OPTICIANS
V. C. Norwood, Manager
309 - 16TH STREET

DENVER
Phone KEystone 4-0806

Oculists - Prescriptions Accurately Filled

DICTA

Mar.-Apr. 1956

sary intention to abandon." Hence, it may be noted that any act
of circumstances from which the court can determine the necessary intention to abandon the use will suffice to preclude the owner from ever re-establishing a non-conforming use in this area. In
view of the fact that the court will require some manifested inten-2
tion to abandon, mere suspension without more will not suffice
but as the period of non-use grows it becomes increasingly easier
to demonstrate the intent to abandon.
It seems that for a municipality to solely rely on this method
to free itself of the burdens of non-conforming uses would be unrealistic. Not only is this doctrine so evasive that we will not be
able to say with any degree of certainty what is or is not an abandonment, but the situation will be rare when a property owner will
allow his action to be classified as an abandonment; he will be constantly on the alert. Although helpful in rare instances, these statutory provisions fall decisively short of effective elimination of the
non-conforming use. Since the non-conforming use seems to be
one of the most serious deterrents to effective city planning, more
affirmative and aggressive action must
be taken than mere reli53
ance upon a voluntary abandonment.

B. Involuntary
An interesting question arises when the use has ceased because
of some force beyond the control of the owner, i.e., some act of
God destroys his premises. Since the general theory of abandonment requires the requisite intention, the owner in these cases is
allowed to rebuild and continue his non-conforming use.54 However, quite frequently zoning ordinances provide that if more than
a certain percentage of the value of the non-conforming building
is destroyed, the right to replace the non-conforming building is
terminated. 55 Such provisions have been held to be within the
constitutional exercise of the police power5 6 These provisions are
predicated upon the theory that once there has been such a complete and substantial destruction," the community is free from
such burden and should not again be subjected to its presence.
Thus, by a quirk of fate, coupled with such a statutory provision,
another method of eliminating the non-conforming use can be seen.
However, the same criticism directed toward voluntary abandonment can be a fortiori be used here, for were this the only method
of eliminating such use, the community would be burdened without any adequate relief. Again a plea for a more affirmative meth-

51Francisco

v. City of Columbus, (Ohio 1937), 31 N.E.(2d) 236 (1937).
i State ex rel. Schaetz v. Manders, 206 Wis. 121, 238 N.W. 835 (1931); Longo v. Eilers, 196
909, 93 N.Y. Supp. (2d) 517 (1949).
SAnother vexatious problem which has confronted our courts is the zoning ordinance which
fails to prescribe a definite period which will constitute the necessary time for an abandonment.
Wis. Stat. (1951), §§ 59.97(7)(c), 60.74(6)(b) (1951). This type of statute has led to much litigation,
and presents a difficult problem of construction. See State ex rel. Morehouse v. Hunt, 235 Wis. 358,
291 N.W. 745 (1940).
U Brous v. Town of Hempstead, 272 App. Div. 31, 69 N.Y. Supp. (2d) 248 (1947). 8 McQUILLIN,
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS, § 25.195 (1950).
Misc.

53 Dayton, Ohio

Zoning Ord.,

§ 210 (75%).

r Jetter v. Hofheins, 190 Misc. 99, 70 N.Y. Supp. (2d) 808 (1947); Incorporated Village of
North Hornell v. Rauber, 181 Misc. 546, 40 N.Y. Supp. (2d) 938 (1943).
%57 The average figure is somewhat around sixty-five per cent, but it is sometimes as high as
75%. see note 56 supra, or as low as 20%. Orlando. Fla. Zoning Ord., § 9.
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od must be restated. Such passive methods to eliminate this problem will be useful only as a supplement to the affirmative actions
which must yet be examined.
III. Extension of Use and RepairsSince the underlying purpose of zoning ordinances is to restrict and ultimately eliminate the non-comforming use, it seems
natural that limitations upon repairs, structural changes and alteraoitns would be widely utilized. 8 The ordinance, however, cannot
with impunity deny an owner the right to make any repairs on nis
property; the right to continue the non-conforming use, whether
expressly granted by statue or under constitutional interpretations,
necessarily includes the right to preserve the use by means of repair.' This right to repair is not synonymous with the right to enlarge the use or to structually alter the buildings.
It has been generally held by the courts that the non-conforming use in existence when a zoning ordinance is passed cannot be
changed into another kind of non-conforming use-it must be the
sLme use and none other." The theory behind this limitation seems
to be predicated upon the principle that this owner is using his
premises in violation of the ordinance and this in opposition to the
public welfare; however, because of constitutional limitations his
use in violation cannot be immediately extinguished,, but it is only
this use, i.e., at the time of the passing or tne orainance, wnich is
afforded protection. Should he choose no longer to use his premises
in this manner, he waives his right to make use of his property in
any manner inconsistent with the ordinance. This surely is a sensible result, keeping in mind that the purpose of zoning is the eventual elimination of these non-conforming uses. To hold otherwise
would be to support the continuance of non-conforming uses when
the reason for such continuance is no longer present. In other
Z 1 YOKLEY, ZONING LAW AND PRACTICE, J 153 (1953); 8 McQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS, § 25.201, p. 388 (1950). "No building or premises containing a non-conforming use
shall hereafter be extended unless such extension shall conform with the provisions of this ordinance for the district in which it is located except as otherwise provided in this ordinance." Dayton,
Ohio Zoning Ord. § 210.
- 8 McQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS, § 25.201 (1950); 1 YOKLEY, ZONING LAW AND
PRACTICE, § 156 (1953), citing Granger v. Board of Adjustment of City of Des'Momes, 241 Ia.
1356, 44 N.W. (2d) 399 (1950). But concerning the validity of a provision which prohibits
any repair where more than a certain percentage has been destroyed see supra.
0 Burmore Co. v. Champion, 124 NJ.L. 548, 12 A.(2d) 713 (1940). 1 YOKLEY, ZONING LAW
AND PRACTICE, § 152 (1953); 35 VA. L. REV. 348 (1949). For the type of changes that are allowed
see, 8 McQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS, §§ 25.203, 25.204 (1950).
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words, since we are forced to give constitutional protection to these
non-conforming uses, we should not extend the scope of such protection any more than is absolutely required to satisfy due process
requirements.
Also quite consistent with the foregoing and with the ultimate
purpose of zoning is the provision found in many ordinances that
structural alterations of non-conforming buildings are prohibited,
unless of course the alterations would convert the non-conforming
use into a conforming use.6" Such provisions are constitutional
and valid.2 However, as seen when we examined the use of eminent domain as a method to combat this problem, merely because
a particular approach is constitutional does not make it ipso facto
desirable. Perhaps a short discussion of the practical effects of prohibiting alterations will help us to formulate an opinion as to the
feasibility of this method.
To allow a non-conforming use to remain, but forbid the alteration of such use seems to effect adversely the public health and
safety. Specifically, in Austin v. Older 63 the property owner was
i'eiused a ounding permit when he desired to remoaei anci modernize his gasoline station by filling in a lubrication pit and extending
a bay window over the tilled-in land. Thus, because ot the resLriction in the ordinance prohibiting alteration or change, the public
was subjected to the discomfort and danger of an open lubrication
pit. If such be an end product of this method to eliminate the nonconforming use, it may well be argued that the means do not justify the ends. Here it seems that we must weigh the advantages and
the disadvantages of such a result, keeping in mind that the public
welfare is our prime consideration.
Of important consideration in determining the desirability of
this method is its effectiveness in eliminating the use. If such a
method be vitally effective, perhaps we should be willing to suffer
with its faults. Perhaps an owner put in the position of the owner
in the Older Case would immediately see that it would be economically unwise to continue his use in an area where he is restricted
from modernizing. He would undoubtedly desire to change and
modernize his building in order to effectively meet competition,
and this would motivate him to move elsewhere, to an area where
he might conduct his business as he saw fit. Added to this factor
is the weaker reason that a non-conforming use will disintegrate
to the point of being unusable.6 4 The objection because of the possible danger to the public is diminutive due to traditional tort
remedies which would be available. Even in Austin v. Older, al-- 1 YOKLEY, ZONING LAW AND PRACTICE, § 155 (1953); 35 VA. L. REV. 348 (1949). "A
non-conforming building cannot be enlarged as a matter of right." BASSETT, ZONING, p. 109
(1940).
12 Austin v. Older, 283 Mich. 667, 278 N.W. 727 (1938); Rehfeld v. City of San Francisco,
218 Col. 83, 21 P. (2d) 419 (1933). See B McQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS, J§ 25.205,
25.206, 25.207 (1950) and 1 YOKLEY, ZONING LAW AND PRACTICE, J§ 153 et seq. (1953) for add;tional problems arising when on attempt is made to limit the alterations of
.re-existing
uses.
For cases attempting to define "structural alterations" see, Goodrich v. Sel ligmon, 298 Ky.
863, 183 S.W.(2d) 625 (1944); Cole v. City of Battle Creek, 298 Mich. 98, 298 N.W. 466 (1941).
m283 Mich. 667, 278 N.W. 727 (1938).
Generally one permitted to enjoy a non-conforming use will have the correlative right to
make repairs of this use.
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though denied the right to remodel his station, the owner will not
with impunity maintain it in a negligent fashion; he will be forever conscious of his legal duty to society; hence, the public safety
is preserved and protected. We can conclude that the public good
would be well served were this method utilized to combat this
problem, although again not alone, but as a supplement. We turn
now to the one method by which the legislature can take direct,
attirmative action to eliminate the non-coniorming use. The
methods previously discussed, with the exception of eminent domain, were left to chance or circumstance; they gave no assurance
that there would be complete elimination of the non-conforming
use.
IV. Amortization
Amortization is a plan whereby the owner of a non-conforming
use is given a certain period of time to eliminate the use. This then
is a direct affirmative method by which non-conforming uses will
ultimately be abolished, and yet because of the mitigating elements
the provision will be upheld by the courts. However, we must
examine now the constitutional problems which confront a council
when they wish to incorporate an amortization provision into an
ordinance.
The constitutional objection is rather fundamental, being that
there would be a deprivation of property without due process of
law. Since the theory of amortization is relatively new, there are
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but a few cases which help us predict how the courts will react
to this method. The few cases that do exist give the impression
that such regulations would be held unconstitutional,"'' although
generally the courts which hold this way do so in the context of an
ordinance which requires the "immediate" elimination of the use.Granted that this latter ordinance should be invalid, it does not follow that the amortization plan is likewise invalid. Should not'the
mitigating factors of this plan allow a court to distinguish this type
of required elimination from the ordinary ordinance which requires immediate elimination? 7 Where the owner of the non-conforming use has sufficient time to wind up his business affairs,
seek a new location, enjoy a monopolistic advantage, the court
should conclude that this is not arbitrary nor unreasonable.
A perplexing problem in connection with this method is the
amount of time that must be given the landowner to eliminate his
use. The most radical decision, and decisions which have borne
much criticism, are the often cited Dema Realty Cases. ' Here an
ordinance was sustained which provided that certain non-conforming uses must be eliminated within one year. Because the amortization period must be equated with the use, in this context a longer period seemed desirable; but this is a question of degree and it
must be assumed that most courts would carefully examine the ordinance and protect the rights of the individuals while at the same
time lending their power to effectuate the purposes of the ordinance. A ten-year period was held a valid measure in Standard
Oil Co. v. Tallahassee," The court felt that the gasoline station
owner in this case was not deprived of his constitutional rights.
The most recent case found by the writer is one in which a fiveyear amortization period was upheld as a constitutional exercise of
the police power.7 "
Traditionally, the method by which the time limitation has
been determined is to equate it with the normal life of the build0 Aurora v. Burns, 319 III. 84, 149 N.E. 784 (1925); Jones v. Los Angeles, 211 Cal. 304, 295
P. 14 (1930). See 9 U. OF CHI. L. REV. 477 (1942).
14 People v. Stanton, 125 Misc. 215, 211 N.Y. Supp. 438 (1925); Jones a. Los Angeles, 211
Cal. 304, 295 P. 14 (1930).
67 See generally 9 U. OF CHI. L. REV. 477 (1942); 102 U. OF PA. L. REV. 91 (1953); Opperman,
"Non-conforming Use and the City Plan," 15 J. LAND & P. U. ECON. 94 (1939),
168 La. 752, 172, 123 So. 314, 613 (1952).
" (5th Cir. 1950),
183 P. (2d) 410.
City of Los Angeles v. Gage, (Cal. App. 1954), 274 P. (2d) 34.
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ing.7'1 In this manner, just regard is given to the rights of the individual while at the same time achieving the purpose of zoning.
The landowner will thus not only have sufficient time to eliminate the use, but during this period of grace he will also have a
monopolistic position which, if properly exploited, will more than
compensate him for the eventual property use. 72 A few of our
larger cities have already recognized the merits of this method and
have incorporated amortization plans in their zoning ordinances.T"
Only through this method-amortization-can we rid our community of the non-conforming use and achieve our goal of a wellplanned community, serving the interests of all the people.
CONCLUSION

Although our initial consideration is the welfare of the community and the advantages which can be secured from a wellplanned community, the rights of individual property owners must
also be recognized.
So long as there are methods to achieve both of these, we
should not disregard the rights of the individual by utilizing other
methods to accomplish our ultimate goal. Our courts should exercise the most stringent control on any attempts by the legislatures
to "take property without compensation." No superficial equation
to the police power should be sustained where a disregard for the
rights of the individual would follow.
The methods outlined heretofor are suggested because the
writer feels that the benefits derived by the public from zoning
are of the utmost importance, but the individual should not bear
the burden of the entire community when the loss can be distributed among those who will reap the benefits.
" "Such non-conforming use shall be discontinued and the building shall be demolished, removed or remodeled and converted to conform to the use which is permitted in the district in
which it is located upon expiration of the normal useful life of such building .
(Emphasis
supplied). Chicago, Ill., Zoning Ord. (1949), § 20. "The only positive method of getting rid of
non-conforming uses yet devised is to amortize a non-conforming building. That is, to determine
the normal useful remaining life af the building and prohibit the owner from maintaining it
after the expiration of that time." Crolly & Norton, "Termination of Non-Conforming Uses," 62
ZONING BULLETIN 1 (1952). 72 9 U. OF CHI. L. REV. 477 (1942).
7'9 U. of CHI. L. REV. 477 (1942).
73Chicago, Ill. Zoning Ord. (1944),§ 20; Cleveland, Ohio Zoning Ord. (1939), §§ 12 81- 9 (e);
New Orleans, La. Zoning Ord. (1929).
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NOTES AND COMMENTS
iTorts: Facts Evidencing Contributory Negligence
In the case of Bennett v. Hall,' an action was brought for
damages for personal injuries alleged to have been sustained by
the plaintiff through the negligent operation of defendant's automobile, resulting in a collision with the automobile which the
plaintiff was driving.
There was no substantial conflict in the evidence which indicated that the accident resulted when the plaintiff, driving at a
speed within the authorized limit, struck the defendant's car which
had pulled on to the principal highway from a side road and into
the path of the plaintiff's automobile. The plaintiff had seen the
defendant's automobile approaching the highway when he (the
plaintiff) was about 500 feet away from the intersection. The
plaintiff watched the defendant approach the intersection, and
when 300 feet away began to slow his automobile. When he realized that the defendant was not going to stop, he "applied his
brakes as quickly as he could," but was unable to avoid the
collision.
The Colorado Supreme Court, in a 4-1 decision, conceded that
the plaintiff was travelling on a preferred thoroughfare, at a speed
under the allowable limit, in his proper lane, had the right-of-way,
and that the defendant was negligent, but affirmed the action of
the District Court of Alamosa County in entering a judgment of
dismissal.
The majority opinion, written by Justice Clark, stated that
the general rule was that the driver of a motor vehicle must at
all times so operate it as to maintain reasonable control over it,
the degree of control being dependent upon conditions and circumstances.
The court cited Crocker v. Johnston,2 in holding, "The right of
way of one proceeding in the favored direction is not absolute,
but he must exercise all reasonable care and keep his car under
control."
The opinion then decided that the plaintiff's failure to guard
against "the probability of the eventuality" furnished ample ground
for a conclusion that the plaintiff was contributorily negligent.
Finally, the court concluded that under the circumstances there
was no reasonable basis upon which fair minded men, without
prejudice, could reach different conclusions, and that, as a matter
of law, the plaintiff was contributorily negligent.
It would appear, to the contrary, that under the facts as above
enunciated, the issue of contributory negligence should have been
submitted to the jury.
In Ankeny v. Talbot,3 the court recognized the fundamental
rule that a person driving a motor vehicle on a highway has the
'
Colo. .. 290 P. 2d 241, 1954-55 C.B.A. Adv. Qh., Vol. 8, No. 2, P. 56, (1955).
243 N.M. 469, 95 P. 2d 214 (1939).
3 126 Colo. 313, 215 P. 2d 1019 (1952).
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right to rely upon observance of the law by other persons driving
motor vehicles thereon. The U.S. Court of Appeals, in Thomasson
v. Burlington TransportationCo.,' adopted the same rule.
'53 C.R.S. 13-4-55 reads: "The driver of a vehicle about to
enter ...

a highway from a private road .

.

. shall yield the right-

of-way to all vehicles approaching on said highway."
An interesting, and applicable, analogy can be drawn from the
case of Rosenbaum v. Riggs5 in which the court held that where
one party had the right-of-way, the other party was under a duty
to recognize that the one having the right-of-way might not slacken
speed.
It seems clear then, that the plaintiff had a right to assume
that the defendant would not take the right-of-way from him in
entering the highway in clear violation of the statutory duty.
The court in the instant case recognized the fundamental rule
to be that the determination of whether the plaintiff failed to
use due and proper care ordinarily should be submitted to the
jury. However, it took the view that under the facts reasonable
men could not differ as to the ultimate determination.
It is felt that the court should have perhaps emphasized the
fundamental rule, heeding its words in Arps v. Denver,":
"It is only in the clearest of cases, when the facts are undisputed, and it is plain that all intelligent men can draw
but one inference from them, that the question is ever one
of law for the court."
On the above bases, the conclusion is inescapable that the
court in the instant case failed to give due consideration to the
effect of the duty of the defendant to stop at the intersection, and
the resulting right in the plaintiff to assume that the defendant
would comply with the law. Such a "right to assume a compliance
with the statute" should necessarily be an element to be considered in determining whether the plaintiff exercised reasonable
care under the circumstances.
It is submitted that the "right to assume compliance," along
with the facts conceded by the court to be present, should be
sufficient to permit the view that "the minds of reasonable men
might properly reach different conclusions." Any other view, it
is felt, would impose upon the driver of a vehicle on the highway
the duty of guarding against, not the probability, but the "possibility of the eventuality." Such a rule would hardly be consistent
with any rule of law previously applied by the Court in this state.
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